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When Brown v. Board of Education' prohibited racial segregation
in public education, it inaugurated a great debate about equal citizen-
ship and federalism that spanned the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. The case reverberates with conflict, with stories about the possi-
bilities - and limits - of constitutional law.
This Article explores the relation of constitutional principle and
constitutional politics in the ways we talk about the decision's mean-
ing. It shows how convictions about the principle on which Brown
rests were forged in conflicts over enforcing Brown, and demonstrates
how such conflicts have produced indirection and contradiction in doc-
trines that enforce the equal protection guarantee. By revisiting early
arguments about Brown, we are better able to describe the values and
concerns that have shaped the development of equal protection law,
and to debate those that might shape its future. At the same time, ex-
ploring the impress of constitutional conflict in our constitutional
commitments invites us to reflect again on the ways that the Court and
the nation make claims on one another - to ask questions about how
the Court forges a constitutional principle that can compel the alle-
giance of the people whose lives it would constrain.
Today, many understand Brown to have ended the era of segrega-
tion in America by declaring the constitutional principle that govern-
ment may not classify on the basis of race. Judicial and popular
speakers invoke this Brown, the anticlassification Brown, quite com-
monly.2 Most recently, the Brown that prohibits classification on the
basis of race was prominently cited by proponents of a law that would
have outlawed racial data collection by the State of California. Sum-
moning Thurgood Marshall's arguments in Brown, the legacy of Mar-
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1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tin Luther King, Jr., and the memory of slavery and segregation, pro-
ponents of the Racial Privacy Initiative (RPI) argued that the anticlas-
sification commitments of Brown required an end to the kind of racial
data collection that has long been used to enforce the nation's antidis-
crimination laws.3  With evident relish, RPI proponents invoked
Brown's authority for a proposal that put at risk the very undertaking
Brown inaugurated. Their claim was strangely - and, for many, dan-
gerously - right and wrong all at once. For a half-century now, the
Constitution has prohibited state action that classifies on the basis of
race, yet as Americans have debated the implications of that principle,
few have thought it barred collecting racial data.4 If collecting racial
data violates the core principle Brown stood for, why exactly did it
take a half-century for the nation seriously to consider the question?
3 Press releases and campaign materials from the "Yes on Proposition 54" campaign sum-
moned the Brown legacy sometimes explicitly and sometimes more subtly. See, e.g., Ward Con-
nerly, Statement to UC Board of Regents (May I5, 2003) ("In 1954, Thurgood Marshall described
racial classifications as 'odious' when he represented the NAACP in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. At that time, the NAACP opposed racial classifications and racial categories and the so-
called 'one-drop' rule."), http://www.racialprivacy.org/content/miscellaneous/regents-board.php;
see also Press Release, Racial Privacy Initiative, California to Challenge Divisive Race Boxes
(May 17, 2oo2) (stating that RPI represents the same principle of colorblindness that Thurgood
Marshall championed "when he wrote, 'Classifications and distinctions based on race or color
have no moral or legal validity in our society. They are contrary to our constitution and laws, and
[the U.S. Supreme Court] has struck down statutes, ordinances or official policies seeking to es-
tablish such classification."' (quoting Thurgood Marshall's brief on behalf of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 0948))), http://www.
racialprivacy.org/content/press/mayI7_2002.php. Other campaign references to Brown were less
explicit. Cf. Press Release, Racial Privacy Initiative, Prop 54 Campaign Chair Ward Connerly
Slams Ninth Circuit Court's Gross Mischaracterization of Prop 54 as "A Ridiculous Lie" (Sept. i5,
2003) ("Prop 54 is not about data. It's about whether or not the government has a right to recog-
nize its citizens by race and classify them accordingly ... Every time our government has recog-
nized the race of its citizens and implemented that knowledge when making policy, it has led to
practices like Jim Crow and the internment of American citizens. I think it's time to end the
practice of putting people in boxes." (quoting Ward Connerly)), http://www.racialprivacy.org/
content/press/sept15_2003.php; Ward Connerly, The Racial Privacy Initiative: Why I Support It
and Why You Should, Too, at http://www.racialprivacy.org/content/miscellaneous/why-support.
php (last visited Nov. 1o, 2003) ("[W]hat RPI is really about is freeing Californians' hearts and
minds from the rigid boxes of race." (emphasis added)). Supporters of RPI have followed the
campaign's lead in linking the Initiative to the symbol of Brown. See, e.g., George F. Will, Drop-
ping the 'One Drop' Rule, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 2002, at 64 ("Who can object to the RPI 48 years
after Thurgood Marshall, then an attorney representing the NAACP in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, said, 'Distinctions by race are so evil, so arbitrary and invidious that a state bound to defend
the equal protection of the laws must not involve them in any public sphere'? Who can object to
the RPI 34 years after Martin Luther King died struggling for a society in which Americans 'will
not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character'?").
4 Government collection of racial data has never been challenged in a sustained, strategic
manner. Civil rights advocates in the I95os and early i96os challenged some state practices that
arbitrarily required designation of race on public records, but they largely abandoned these claims
as civil rights legislation increasingly called for racial data collection to aid enforcement. See
infra note 158.
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And why did RPI's recent defeat attract so little commentary? 5 Com-
plex, though incompletely articulated, understandings would seem to
guide popular intuitions about the practices the anticlassification prin-
ciple condemns.
What is at stake in the claim that Brown prohibits racial classifica-
tion? Sometimes it simply expresses the view that the anticlassification
commitment inaugurates the modern equal protection tradition. But it
may also express the normative conviction that anticlassification em-
bodies the tradition's fundamental value, the value of individualism.
In Missouri v. Jenkins,6 Justice Thomas explained:
Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-science
research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental, truth that the
government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis of
race.... At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals,
and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this rea-
son that we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny
7
For many, the belief that anticlassification commitments are fun-
damental entails the view that our tradition embraces a particular
conception of equality, one that is committed to individuals rather than
to groups. On this account, the tradition's embrace of the anticlassifi-
cation principle signifies its repudiation of an alternative conception of
equal protection, the antisubordination principle: the conviction that it
is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior
5 National news sources provided scant coverage of RPI's defeat. See, e.g., John M. Broder,
Economy a Factor: Californians Voice Deep Dissatisfaction with Governor's Record, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2003, at Ai (devoting a mere two sentences to the initiative's defeat in the midst of a larger
article about the governor's recall); Greg Pierce, Inside Politics, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1o, 2003, at
A9 (stating simply that the initiative did not pass and that Connerly vowed to advance it again).
California media and national college newspapers gave the issue somewhat more attention, at-
tributing the initiative's defeat to fears about its effect on public health issues, see, e.g., Stephen
Magagnini, Prop. 54 Soundly Beaten: The Tide Turned When Foes of the Ballot Measure Shifted
Gears from Bias to Health Care, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 8, 2003, or citing it as an end to anti-
minority referenda in California, see, e.g., William Brand, UC Berkeley Students Celebrate Sepa-
rate Victories, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR, Oct. 9, 2003. Although a year earlier the issue had
seemed poised to initiate a national debate, see, e.g., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Briefing on the
Consequences of Government Race Data Collection Bans on Civil Rights (May 17, 2002),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/racedataltrans.htm, once rejected, the nation seemed to consider it the
short-lived scheme of a small group of political actors. See, e.g, Leslie Wolf Branscomb, Defeat of
Prop. 54 Is Called Win for Grass-Roots Politics, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 8, 2003 (stating
that Arnold Schwarzenegger, the victorious Republican in the gubernatorial election that was held
concurrent with the referendum on Proposition 54, referred to backers of the proposition as
"right-wing crazies").
6 515 U.S. 70 (995).
7 Id. at 120-21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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social status of historically oppressed groups." The fundamentality of
the anticlassification principle thus explains various features of our
equal protection tradition, foremost among them its commitment to
protect individuals against all forms of racial classification, including
"benign" or "reverse" discrimination. A commitment to protect indi-
viduals rather than groups also explains why constitutional law does
not treat as presumptively discriminatory facially neutral practices
that have a disparate impact on historically excluded groups.9 Schol-
ars debate what our constitutional understanding of equality ought to
be, but most would agree that American equal protection law has ex-
pressed anticlassification, rather than antisubordination, commitments
as it has developed over the past half-century.10
8 For example, Owen Fiss called his version of the antisubordination principle the "group-
disadvantaging principle," and he defined it as the principle that laws may not "aggravate" or
"perpetuate ... the subordinate status of a specially disadvantaged group." Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, io8, 157 (1976). Many others
have urged that equal protection is best understood as concerned with group subordination. See,
e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 162-7 7 (1987) (asserting that "[t]he Court must review with great care laws that burden
a racial minority"); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987) (repudiating a model of equality focused on "difference" in favor of
one that analyzes "dominance"); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979) (arguing that courts should
inquire "whether [a] policy or practice ... integrally contributes to the maintenance of an under-
class or a deprived position because of gender status"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-21, at 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988) (advocating that facially neutral state
action be analyzed in accordance with an antisubjugation principle, such that "strict judicial scru-
tiny would be reserved for those government acts that, given their history, context, source, and
effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate subordination but also to reflect a tradition of hos-
tility toward an historically subjugated group, or a pattern of blindness or indifference to the in-
terests of that group").
9 Owen Fiss famously anticipated and contested these implications of the anticlassification
principle (or as he referred to it, the antidiscrimination principle), when he called for the embrace
of the "group-disadvantaging principle," a new mediating principle for the Equal Protection
Clause, in 1976. See Fiss, supra note 8, at IO8. Fiss's concern about the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple was that it might lead courts to misapprehend the correct resolution to two pressing ques-
tions facing the American judiciary in the 1970s: the question of the "permissibility of preferential
treatment," id. at 129, and the "problem of facially innocent criteria," id. at 141.
10 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. ALEXANDER, EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE IRRELEVANCE
OF "GROUPS" I (Issues in Legal Scholarship, The Origins and Fate of Antisubordination Theory,
Article No. i, 2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/arti (stating that the Supreme Court re-
jected the "disparate group impact" theory in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and has
shown no interest in reassessing this stance); DANIEL SABBAGH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
THE GROUP DISADVANTAGING PRINCIPLE 3 (Issues in Legal Scholarship, The Origins and
Fate of Antisubordination Theory, Article No. 14, 2003), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art4
(exploring the institutional reasons why courts have failed to embrace the group-disadvantaging
principle); MARK TUSHNET, THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED: GROUPS, SOCIAL WELFARE
RIGHTS, AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE I (Issues in Legal Scholarship, The Origins
and Fate of Antisubordination Theory, Article No. 7, 2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ilsiss2/
art7 (stating that Fiss's group-oriented approach to equal protection law has met "complete rejec-
tion on the level of constitutional doctrine"); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88
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Revisiting early debates over Brown draws into question this pic-
ture of our equal protection tradition, and teaches much about the
concerns that prompted the adoption and evolving application of anti-
classification discourse in equal protection law. The anticlassification
principle with which we are familiar today did not organize early de-
bates over Brown. In fact, in the decision's immediate wake, debate
often focused on questions of group harm, and many justifications of-
fered for Brown sounded like an antisubordination defense of the opin-
ion might today. But what revisiting this debate makes clearest is
that, in this early period, talk of classification and subordination did
not have the same significance it now has. The understanding that
anticlassification and antisubordination are competing principles that
VA. L. REV. 951, 1009 (2002) ("Current Supreme Court doctrine understands equal protection as
an antidiscrimination principle rather than an antisubordination principle ...."); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. I, 37 (1991) ("The modern Court
has moved away from ... notions of race that recognize the diverging historical experiences of
Black and white Americans .... In place of these concepts, the Court relies increasingly on the
formal-race concept of race, a vision of race as unconnected to the historical reality of Black op-
pression."); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 62 n.66 (iggo) (noting that the main problem with the antisub-
ordination model is that "for whatever reasons, antisubordination approaches to equal protection,
regarding sex or race, have not met with judicial acceptance"); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", lo8
YALE L.J. 485, 558 (1998) (observing, in reference to the antisubordination principle, that "the
Supreme Court appears to have rejected this class-based view of heightened scrutiny").
Some scholars have questioned this characterization of the equal protection tradition and
proposed a more complex account of the values it vindicates. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (available in an earlier version as JACK M. BALKIN & REVA
B. SIEGEL, THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS TRADITION: ANTICLASSIFICATION OR ANTI-
SUBORDINATION (Issues in Legal Scholarship, The Origins and Fate of Antisubordination The-
ory, Article No. II, 2003), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artii) ("Inconsistency in the ways
that courts have implemented the anticlassification principle, over time and in different parts of
the law, suggests that the discourse of anticlassification conceals other values that do much of the
work in determining which practices antidiscrimination law enjoins. Using this method of analy-
sis, we can see that many values guide application of the anticlassification principle. Sometimes,
... courts have implemented the anticlassification principle in a fashion that preserves status rela-
tions. But often, and particularly as the civil rights agenda expands, the judiciary has applied the
anticlassification principle in ways that dismantle status relations."); Ruth Colker, The Section
Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV 653, 688 & n.175 (2o0o) (arguing that "the Court has not gone
so far as to base the law of equal protection solely on an antidifferentiation perspective," and that
"[o]nly Justices Thomas and Scalia have rejected the antisubordination principle entirely"); Ran-
dall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV.
L. REV 1327, 1335 (1986) ("[A]gainst the backdrop of laws that used racial distinctions to exclude
Negroes from opportunities available to white citizens, it seemed that racial subjugation could be
overcome by mandating the application of race-blind law. In retrospect, however, it appears that
the concept of race-blindness was simply a proxy for the fundamental demand that racial subju-
gation be eradicated. This demand, which matured over time in the face of myriad sorts of oppo-
sition, focused upon the condition of racial subjugation; its target was not only procedures that
overtly excluded Negroes on the basis of race, but also the self-perpetuating dynamics of subordi-
nation that had survived the demise of American apartheid." (footnote omitted)).
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vindicate different complexes of values and justify different doctrinal
regimes is an outgrowth of decades of struggle over Brown, and is not
itself a ground of the decision or of the earliest debates it prompted.
These early debates suggest reasons why struggles over Brown's
implementation produced the widespread understanding of the modern
equal protection tradition as founded in the embrace of an anticlassifi-
cation principle and repudiation of an antisubordination principle. At
the core of arguments about classification and group harm that stretch
across the decades are questions of legitimacy: in what ways and to
what extent can the Constitution be construed to mandate intervention
in the affairs of a relatively powerful group, on behalf of a less power-
ful group? Conflicts over this question do much to shape the relation
of claims about racial classification and racial subordination in the
modern equal protection tradition.
As we recognize the role such conflicts play in constitutional inter-
pretation, we can begin to develop a better descriptive account of the
concerns that shaped the contours of the modern equal protection tra-
dition. Standing alone, the principle that it is wrong to classify on the
basis of race neither states a norm of conduct nor articulates a complex
of values that can account for the path along which equal protection
law has developed. Instead, the anticlassification principle as we un-
derstand it today is the artifact of political struggles over Brown's im-
plementation: application of the principle varies over time and across
social practices because the principle is in fact applied to vindicate dif-
ferent kinds of social concerns. The record suggests that, at some
points in our history, courts have employed claims about the wrongs of
racial classification to express and to mask constitutional concerns
about practices that enforce second-class citizenship for members of
relatively powerless social groups - and at other points in our history,
courts have employed claims about the wrongs of racial classification
to block, diffuse, and limit constitutional expression of such concerns.
The debates over Brown's implementation show the complex ways in
which concerns about legitimacy have moved courts to mask and to
limit a constitutional regime that would intervene in the affairs of the
powerful on behalf of the powerless.
As Frank Michelman's analysis of South African equality jurispru-
dence in this Symposium shows," a constitutional court dismantling
an apartheid social order must consider the evolving relations of racial
groups if it is to craft a jurisprudence that can bridge the nation's ra-
cial past and future in terms that will command the allegiance of all its
citizens. This dilemma haunts the very language in which we talk
11 See Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination
Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1378 (2004).
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about Brown's meaning. Revisiting early debates over Brown shows
how conflicts over efforts to change a society's racial order shape a ju-
risprudence of transition.
Part I of this Article revisits early debates over Brown to show how
principled justifications for the decision were first forged in debates
over the decision's legitimacy. In Brown, the Court reasoned that "[t]o
separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."1 2  Today, we might focus on the "solely
because of ... race" language, but at the time of the decision, debate
focused on Brown's claim about the ways segregation harmed blacks.
Controversy erupted about the social science evidence in the opinion's
Footnote Eleven because contemporaries generally understood Brown
to rest on judgments about the harm that segregation inflicts on mi-
nority schoolchildren. The Court's Southern critics questioned the
Court's evidence of harm and angrily asked which harms and whose
harms the Court would intervene to redress. Part I considers this con-
flict over Brown as it reverberated within the legal academic commu-
nity, in the debates over Herbert Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law.' 3  Revisiting the Neutral Principles debate
shows that its participants - including Wechsler, who famously ques-
tioned Brown and the many prominent academics who defended the
decision - understood Brown as concerned with questions of group
harm often associated with an antisubordination framework. At the
same time the debate illuminates the distinctive vulnerabilities of anti-
subordination discourse as a language in which to justify controverted
constitutional decisions. The anxieties and conflicts aired in the Neu-
tral Principles debate suggest that Southern resistance to Brown may
have played an important role in propelling the shift in equal protec-
tion doctrine from talk of group harm to talk of classification. The
presumption against classification was a "cooler" way of justifying
Brown because it could be judicially deployed without extended dis-
cussion of the reasons segregation harmed blacks.
Yet as Part II shows, during the i96os - when the Court first ar-
ticulated the general presumption that racial classifications are uncon-
stitutional - the practical significance of this commitment was still in-
choate. If debate over Brown's rationale played a role in prompting
justification of equal protection doctrine in terms of an anticlassifica-
tion principle, debate over Brown's reach helped consolidate the prin-
12 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
13 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
(1959); see infra section I.C, pp. 1489-97.
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ciple's authority and implications. Talking about the wrongs of classi-
fication was not merely a cooler way of justifying Brown; it was simul-
taneously an effective way of limiting Brown. Convergence of these
conversations of quite distinct political salience helped produce the an-
ticlassification Brown that emerged in the i96os and 197os. This dy-
namic played itself out in any number of areas: in matters concerning
the scope of remedy in the South, liability for so-called de facto dis-
crimination in the North, and the question whether state actors were
permitted to correct racial imbalance in the absence of judicial decree
- a question that evolved into the modern debate over affirmative ac-
tion. I consider the last in more detail, because it supplies an easy con-
text in which to appreciate some of the disparate values that shaped
anticlassification talk as it evolved in the i96os and 197os, and be-
cause it strikingly recapitulates the debate over racial harm and classi-
fication recounted in Part I.
Part III considers how this story of constitutional principle and
politics alters our understanding of equal protection law today. Revis-
iting early debates over Brown has the simple virtue of reminding us
that however canonical Brown may have become in the intervening
half-century, heated racial conflict has shaped the path and form of the
decision's canonization.1 4 The memory of this violence lies repressed
in the presumption that racial classification is unconstitutional - a
presumption whose meanings remain unstable, the locus of conflicts
over Brown the nation has yet to resolve. If we attend to long strug-
gles over Brown's enforcement, we can make better sense of equal pro-
tection law's indirection and contradiction and so discern many ways
in which antisubordination and anticlassification are friends as well as
agonists. History shows that antisubordination values live at the root
of the anticlassification principle - endlessly contested, sometimes
bounded, often muzzled. Antisubordination values are not foreign to
the modern equal protection tradition, but a founding part of it, deeply
tempered by other values, including the need to have a Constitution
that speaks to all.
The Constitution's authority - its capacity to speak to and for all
- depends in significant measure on the ways it creates community in
conflict and finds legitimacy under conditions of disagreement. The
flexibility and ambiguity of anticlassification talk have given it the
14 As Brown was canonized, conflict over the decision was channeled into conflict about its
meaning. See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 389 (2ooo) (examining the dynamics of canonization through the history of
Supreme Court nomination hearings); see also Jack M. Balkin, Introduction to WHAT BROWN V
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 8-14 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001)
(discussing the political struggles over the decision's meaning).
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power to answer and to defer questions about the Constitution's mean-
ing,'5 and at times have enabled it to vindicate antisubordination
commitments in ways that "hotter" talk of group harm cannot. The
Article concludes by reflecting on how these concerns have given
shape to the Court's recent ruling on affirmative action in Grutter v.
Bollinger 6 and to other features of modern equal protection law.
I. BROWN'S RATIONALE: EARLY DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONALLY COGNIZABLE HARMS
In law and in popular debate, Brown is often invoked as an opin-
ion prohibiting states from classifying on the basis of race. 17 But in so
recalling Brown, we reason from an understanding that emerged from
struggles over enforcement of the decision, rather than from an under-
standing that prevailed at the time the case was decided.
When Brown was first handed down, contemporaries understood
that the Court had taken the momentous step of declaring that segre-
gation in public education was unconstitutional, yet it was not clear
exactly how the Fourteenth Amendment would alter the organization
of schools or how it would affect the many other institutions in the
United States in which race played a shaping role.' 8 The Court's
15 Cf. Balkin & Siegel, supra note io (demonstrating how anticlassification discourse has func-
tioned both to disrupt and to rationalize social stratification).
16 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
17 See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (979) ("Certain classifications ... in
themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm. A racial classification, re-
gardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an ex-
traordinary justification. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 [(1964)]." (parallel citations omitted)); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)
("This presumption of constitutional validity ... disappears if a statutory classification is predi-
cated on criteria that are, in a constitutional sense, 'suspect,' the principal example of which is a
classification based on race, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483." (parallel citations
omitted)); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("Not all legislation ... is entitled to the
same presumption of validity. The presumption is not present when a State has enacted legisla-
tion whose purpose or effect is to create classes based upon racial criteria, since racial classifica-
tions, in a constitutional sense, are inherently 'suspect.' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184;
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483." (parallel citations omitted)).
18 See, e.g., Ernst Borinski, A Legal and Sociological Analysis of the Segregation Decision of
May 17, 1954, I5 U. PITT. L. REV. 622, 625 (i954) ("The limitations of the decision have to be rec-
ognized. The court stated only that segregation in public education is a denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws. The decision does not in itself cover the validity of segregation in other areas
where it is as yet practiced under the protection of the laws. Notwithstanding this limitation,
other areas of segregation will be affected by this decision."); Paul G. Kauper, Segregation in Pub-
lic Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 MICH. L. REV 1137, 1151-52 (i954) ("To be
sure, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education applies only to segregation in state supported
schools. Moreover, the decision does not mean that the states are required to establish school dis-
tricts in such a way as to insure racial integration. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require
states to take steps to force the two races together. Segregation as a social pattern will continue
and it will be reflected in the public school system."); see also Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive
1478 [Vol. Ii17:1470
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opinion in Brown read, and was received, much like the Lawrence v.
Texas"9 opinion of last Term: as a momentous intervention into a con-
tested set of social arrangements, whose ultimate logic and practical
application still remained unclear.2 0 Both opinions reasoned in ways
that might impugn status-linked features of other institutions and
practices - including, most prominently, the institution of marriage2'
- yet neither case announced an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment that explicitly addressed practices other than those di-
rectly at issue.
Resistance to Brown prompted continuing argument about its ra-
tionale and its grounds, not simply its reach. Criticism of Brown's rea-
soning focused in particular on the Court's ground for rejecting
Plessy:2 the Court's claim that segregation harmed minority school-
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 247 (i99I) ("Brown's narrow ration-
ale left unresolved the constitutionality of segregation in contexts less fundamental than education
- that is, most areas of life.").
19 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
20 The Lawrence decision immediately prompted speculation about the range of practices the
Court might rule unconstitutional. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Legalize Gay Sex-
ual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal of Court's '86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at Ai (re-
porting the Court's decision in Lawrence and discussing its uncertain reach); Frank J. Murray,
Sodomy Law Struck Down, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at Ai (same); David Von Drehle, A De-
bate on Marriage, and More, Now Looms, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at Ai (same).
21 Questions about the opinion's implications for marriage were at the heart of Brown, see in-
fra pp. 1483-84, as well as Lawrence. Although the majority opinion in Lawrence did not address
the implications of the decision for the institution of marriage, Justices O'Connor and Scalia
sparred over the issue in their opinions. Compare Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate
state interest here, such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage.
Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations - the asserted state interest in this case -
other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group."), with id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion dismantles the struc-
ture of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapproba-
tion of homosexual conduct is 'no legitimate state interest' for purposes of proscribing that con-
duct; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), '[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring'; what justification could there possibly be for denying the
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising '[t]he liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion'? . . . This case 'does not involve' the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the
belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court." (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478, 2484)). Indeed, Justice Scalia
argued that "State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturba-
tion, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are ... sustainable only in light of Bowers'
validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question
by today's decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them
from its holding." Id. at 2490.
22 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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children. The South relentlessly attacked the social science authority
arrayed to support this claim in the opinion's Footnote Eleven. One
can follow the dispute over Brown's claims of harm as they organize
the debate over Footnote Eleven, reverberate through the controversy
over Herbert Wechsler's Neutral Principles,23 and come to supply rea-
sons for courts to embrace the doctrinal presumption that racial classi-
fications are unconstitutional.
A. What Brown Said:
Brown, Bolling, and the Language of Classification
Brown reasoned about the constitutionality of segregation in educa-
tion in context-dependent terms. Only after explicitly remarking on
the significance of educational opportunity in modern life24 did the
Court rule that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional: "To
separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone. '25  The Court substantiated this claim by
quoting findings that
[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually in-
terpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferi-
ority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanc-
tion of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
26
The Court then used these findings to repudiate the portions of
Plessy that claimed segregation was permissible under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because it inflicted no legally cognizable harm on
blacks. 27 "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowl-
edge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that segregation
23 Wechsler, supra note 13, at i; see infra section 1489-97.
24 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.").
25 Id. at 494.
26 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting an unreported finding of a three-judge panel sitting in
Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27 The Court in Plessy stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assump-
tion that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge
of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely be-
cause the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-5 1.
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harms blacks] is amply supported by modern authority, 2 8 Chief Jus-
tice Warren reasoned, substantiating this claim by citing social science
evidence in the opinion's Footnote Eleven. 29 "Any language in Plessy
v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
'30
It is this passage of the opinion that has come to be read as a
statement that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids state action that
classifies on the basis of race, 3 1 but no statement to this effect appears
in Brown. The omission would certainly appear intentional. At the
time of the decision, there was Fifth Amendment case law requiring
close scrutiny of government policies that classify on the basis of race.
Korematsu so held, 32 and the Court invoked that decision in Brown's
companion case, Boiling v. Sharpe,33 which declared segregation in the
District of Columbia public schools to contravene the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 34 But as contemporaries realized, the
language of classification was conspicuously absent in Brown, which
emphasized that racially segregated schools harmed children by caus-
ing in them powerful feelings of "inferiority as to their status in the
community. '35  The decision did not condemn racial classification as
such; rather, it addressed the harmful consequences of separating
school children in a specific institutional context.
36
The Court soon made it clear enough that Brown's holding was not
so limited. The Court enjoined segregation in public transportation
and recreation facilities in several per curiam decisions that extended
Brown beyond the context of education, but it did not clarify the ana-
28 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
29 See id. at494 n.Ii.
30 Id. at 494-95.
31 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. i, 39-40 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In a very few
other cases, we have required that the State pass a more demanding test because of the judgment
that the classification drawn by the State is virtually never permissible from a constitutional per-
spective. Such classifications are deemed 'suspect' and strictly scrutinized. Until 1971, only race
and national origin had been so classified by the Court. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 494 (954)").
32 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
33 347 U.S. 497 (954).
34 See id. at 500.
35 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
36 Contemporaries recognized that the Court employed different reasoning in its Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Fayson v. Beard, 134 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Tex. 1955)
("Mr. Justice Warren in one of the School Segregation Cases (Brown v. Board of Education)
clearly expressed the opinion of the Court that equality in tangibles was not a complete answer to
the problems of segregation in public schools, for notwithstanding such equality, there still existed
an unconstitutional discrimination created by segregation because of the impact upon segregated
students of intangible or psychological factors. In the other School Segregation Case, Bolling v.
Sharpe, it was said ... : 'Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particu-
lar care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence Constitutionally suspect' ...." (quot-
ing Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499)); see also infra note 38.
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lytical basis for doing so. 3 7  At the time, some explained the per curiam
decisions as demonstrating that the Court was implicitly importing
doctrine prohibiting racial classification into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment context.38 Yet it was clear enough that the Court was not acting
37 See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 54 (1958) (mem.)
(per curiam), aff'g 252 F. Supp. 2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (public parks and golf courses); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam), affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956)
(intrastate buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam), vacat-
ing and remanding 223 F.2d 93 (5 th Cir. 1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam), affig 220 F.2d 386 (4 th
Cir. 1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S.
971, 971 (I954) (mem.) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953) (munici-
pal recreational facilities). For a more extensive list of the Court's per curiam desegregation deci-
sions, see 2 THOMAS I. EMERSON ET AL., POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1249 (student ed. 1967).
38 See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 531,
549 (1961) ("It will be remembered that the famous school desegregation decision rested squarely
and peculiarly on the finding that segregation in public schools resulted in harmful, discrimina-
tory effects on Negro children. Yet in view of a series of later per curiam decisions, it must now
be inferred that the school desegregation decision really was grounded on a broader principle,
namely, that all segregation legislation is invalid since it rests on an impermissible basis of classifi-
cation." (footnotes omitted)); Wechsler, supra note 13, at 32 ("The Court did not declare, as many
wish it had, that the fourteenth amendment forbids all racial lines in legislation, though subse-
quent per curiam decisions may, as I have said, now go that far. Rather, as Judge Hand observed,
the separate-but-equal formula was not overruled 'in form' but was held to have 'no place' in
public education on the ground that segregated schools are 'inherently unequal,' with deleterious
effects upon the colored children in implying their inferiority, effects which retard their educa-
tional and mental development." (footnote omitted)); see also Note, An Indigent Criminal Defen-
dant Seeks an Appeal, 36 IND. L.J. 237, 246 n.45 (I961) (citing Brown as a "school segregation
case holding that racial classification is per se irrational").
But anticlassification was not the only, or even the dominant, way of expressing the signifi-
cance of the per curiam decisions. Many explained the decisions as concerned with practices that
enforced the inferior status of blacks. See, e.g., 2 EMERSON, supra note 37, at 1249 ("Since
Brown, the Supreme Court, by means of summary per curiam decisions, has held segregation in-
valid in numerous other areas, including some in which it seems clear that 'the sense of inferiority
engendered by segregation' would take different forms from that following segregated educa-
tion."); Ernst Borinski, The Emerging Case Law in the Segregation Decisions of the Supreme
Court of May 17, 1954, and May 31, i955: Its Crystallization and Trends, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 416,
428 (1956) ("By affirming the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the
Supreme Court took the position that the separating of races denotes inferiority of the Negro
group and is a violation of the due process and equal protection clause if sanctioned by law. The
two per curiam decisions of the Supreme Court reveal clearly that the principles of the decision of
May 17, 1954, shall find direct application to other areas of segregation." (footnote omitted));
Jacob D. Hyman & Wade J. Newhouse, Jr., Desegregation of the Schools: The Present Legal Situa-
tion, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 2o8, 218 (1965) ("[Tlhe relevance of the psychological evidence is that it
served as one factor in developing judicial wisdom concerning the role which segregation plays as
part of a pattern of social control, a control beginning with the forbidden premise that Negroes
are as a class inferior to whites .... Our position tends to be confirmed by the series of per curiam
opinions in which the Court, without further explanation, invalidated the maintenance of separate
but equal state recreational, transportation and courtroom facilities."); see also infra pp. 1484-89
(discussing observers, supporters, and critics of Brown who read the decision as grounded in con-
cerns about the harm segregation inflicted on blacks).
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on the understanding that all racial classifications were unconstitu-
tional.
In the same period when the Court decided the per curiam cases, it
refused to decide a challenge to Virginia's antimiscegenation law. 39 It
was widely appreciated that the Court was proceeding incrementally,
avoiding any decision that would commit it to a course of action that
would incite further resistance. As Edmond Cahn put it:
The strategic considerations underlying the Brown and Bolling cases are
fascinating to spell out. Apparently, the Justices determined that, in strik-
ing down segregated education, they were accomplishing quite enough for
present purposes, and that the chances of obtaining cooperation from the
rank and file of white Southerners would be reduced if the decisions
should seem to touch even by implication on wider issues. If this is the
way they reasoned, one must further commend their sagacity. On this rea-
soning, Plessy v. Ferguson must not be disturbed except as it related to
matters of public education.
40
The Court seems to have been especially concerned not to address
questions concerning the constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws
too soon after Brown, when Southerners were denouncing Brown itself
as a dangerous first step in a "social program for amalgamation of the
two races. '41 (The Daily News of Jackson, Mississippi, greeted Brown
with the warning: "White and Negro children in the same schools will
lead to miscegenation. Miscegenation leads to mixed marriages and
mixed marriages lead to mongrelization of the human race. '42) As
Alexander Bickel observed:
[A] judgment legitimating [antimiscegenation] statutes would have been
unthinkable, given the principle of the School Segregation Cases .... But
would it have been wise, at a time when the Court had just pronounced
39 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 89i, 891 (I955) (mem.) (per curiam), remanded to go S.E.2d 849
(Va.), motion to recall mandate denied per curiam, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (mem.).
40 Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 3o N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 153 (I955).
41 TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY 64 (i955). A black columnist for the Atlanta Daily
World observed, "Every argument against the Supreme Court's decision of May 17, 1954, and
every argument against integration the white man has been able to propound, is the argument
against interracial marriage." Dean Gordon B. Hancock, Between the Lines: Interracial Marriage
a False Alarm, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Apr. 12, 1956, at 4, quoted in Anders Walker, Legislat-
ing Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following
Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399, 400 n.7 (i997).
When Naim reached the Court in the immediate wake of Brown, the Court decided that
"[i]n view of the difficulties engendered by the segregation cases it would be wise judicial policy to
duck this question for a time." Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision-
making in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. i, 63 (1979) (quoting an October Term
1955 certiorari memo written by one of Justice Burton's clerks). For an account of the Court's
decision to "duck" the issue Naim presented, see id. at 62-67.
42 BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 204 (Waldo
E. Martin Jr. ed., 1998) (quoting Bloodstains on White Marble Steps, DAILY NEWS (Jackson,
Miss.), May i8, 1954).
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its new integration principle, when it was subject to scurrilous attack by
men who predicted that integration of the schools would lead directly to
"mongrelization of the race" . . . , on an issue that the Negro community as
a whole can hardly be said to be pressing hard at the moment, to declare
that the states may not prohibit racial intermarriage?
43
Thus, contemporaries appreciated that the Brown Court had not
adopted a principle prohibiting states from engaging in racial classifi-
cation of the sort that would have resolved the question of interracial
marriage that the Court deferred in Naim.44 There were those who
speculated that Brown might rest on a rule about racial classifications
but thought that the Court was proceeding in a context-specific
way, determining on a case-by-case basis whether racial classifications
were reasonable. 45  In this period, the most sustained conversations
about the values that might guide the Court in determining what prac-
tices violated the Equal Protection Clause took shape as an argument
about the justifications the Court could invoke for its decision in
Brown itself.
B. Brown, Plessy, and the Language of Harm:
Massive Resistance and Footnote Eleven
In the years after the Court decided Brown, what attracted most
commentary and debate was not the incipient reach of the case but its
rationale: that enforced separation of the races was unconstitutional
43 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 174 (2d ed. 1962).
44 Cf. Andrew D. Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation Stat-
utes, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 2o8, 215 (i957) ("The 'separate but equal' theory, so recently rejected
with regard to public education and transportation, has never logically had any place in the dis-
cussion of interracial marriage."). For a discussion of Southern reception of Naim, see Walker,
supra note 41, at 400 n.7.
45 See Morris D. Forkosch, American Democracy and Procedural Due Process, 24 BROOK. L.
REV. 173, 232 n.218 (1958) ("In the Segregation Cases, the Supreme Court now held that the clas-
sification so announced sixty years ago could not stand, especially since it was a judicial compro-
mise which the judiciary today could denounce .... Thus, in the field of education at least, there
must be equal protection accorded to all pupils in public schools, regardless of color."); Patricia P.
Shad, Note, Constitutionality of Restricted Scholarships, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 604, 6o6 (1958) ("De-
cisions of the Supreme Court over the last decade make it extremely doubtful that any classifica-
tion based on race is reasonable in the field of education."). As late as the mid-ig6os, commenta-
tors discerned the Court to be proceeding incrementally. See Recent Developments, School
Board's Effort To Reduce De Facto Segregation Upheld, Balaban v. Rubin, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 140,
145 (1965) ("Several per curiam decisions by the Supreme Court since Brown have made at least
one commentator wonder whether the Supreme Court is approaching a per se rule. Despite this
authority to the contrary, the nearly universal belief is that the Brown decision itself did not de-
clare that the fourteenth amendment forbids all racial distinctions in legislation. The Court's
heavy emphasis on the feelings of inferiority engendered by compulsory segregation indicates that
the Court considered segregation in public schools solely on the basis of race to be unreasonable
and unrelated to any proper governmental purpose and, therefore, a denial of equal protection,
but not on a per se basis." (footnotes omitted)).
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because of the harm it inflicted on Negro citizens. 46 Plessy found state
action segregating the races in matters of social intercourse reason-
able47 - among other reasons, because segregation did not "stamp[]
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. '48 In Brown, the Court
revisited that judgment. It was precisely in finding that segregation
harmed Negro schoolchildren that the Court explicitly rejected
Plessy's reasoning.
46 In the i96os, the main casebook on civil rights discussed scholarly commentary on Brown as
focused on its "thesis" that segregation harmed blacks. See 2 EMERSON, supra note 37, at 1248
("As Professor Wechsler suggests, a prime question in evaluating the decision was the centrality of
the thesis put forward by the appellants that state-imposed segregation was harmful psychologi-
cally to Negro school children. A statement to this effect was signed by sociologists, anthropolo-
gists, psychologists, and psychiatrists who worked in race relations.... This basis for the decision
was sharply criticized by certain scholars supporting the Brown decision."); see also id. at 1250
("Boiling can be read as breaking loose from any sociological theory and suggesting that, although
Brown proceeded on a narrow ground, a broader formulation would have commanded support if
that had been necessary. On the other hand, the Court in Bolling may have reached its conclusion
that racial discrimination in public education is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process'
on the basis of the inequities, including those of a psychological character, that were held to have
been established in Brown."). For examples of other academic commentary in this vein, see supra
note 38, which discusses the per curiam opinions; and infra section I.C, pp. 1489-97, which dis-
cusses the Wechsler debate.
In this era, courts still viewed Brown as an opinion concerning status harm. See, e.g., Olson
v. Bd. of Educ., 25o F Supp. 1000, loo6 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) ("In Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, the Court struck down schools which were compulsorily segregated by law, holding that
the separation of children in schools 'solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone.' It did not decide that the same emotional and mental condition also resulted when
the segregation was not compulsory but arose from the residential pattern of the neighborhood,
nor did it decide that there must be coerced integration of the races in order to accomplish educa-
tional equality for this also would require an appraisal of the effect upon the hearts and minds of
those who were so coerced." (citations omitted) (quoting Brown, 387 U.S. at 494)); see also Bynum
v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204, 208 (E.D. La. 1963) (striking down Louisiana's 1956 Anti-Mixing
Law; quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), for the proposition that
"[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"; and citing Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 0954), as grounds for holding that "[tihe humiliation of being
restricted to a certain area in [an] Auditorium is sufficient harm to give the plaintiffs standing to
sue").
47 The Plessy Court reasoned:
So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case
reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation,
and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the
legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act with ref-
erence to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view
to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good or-
der. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even re-
quires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which
does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
48 Id. at 55I1.
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For this very reason, Southerners singled out for special fury the
social science evidence of segregation's harm in the decision's much-
maligned Footnote Eleven. 49  Southerners attacked Brown's claims
about the harms of segregation in a variety of registers. Critics im-
pugned the credibility of the social science evidence as such, arguing
that Kenneth Clark, who conducted the famous "doll studies," had
perjured himself; hence, they argued, there was no valid evidence
to support the claim of fact on which the Brown decision rested.50
At the same time, Southerners countered the Court by producing sci-
entific evidence supporting the claim that it was integration, not segre-
gation, that inflicted a variety of harms on those subject to it.5 I As
they did so, they put in issue the question of harm itself: what harms,
and whose harms, were relevant in determining the Constitution's
meaning?
49 See generally Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social
Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793 (2oo2) (discuss-
ing the reception of Brown in terms of the debates about the Court's reliance on social science
literature).
50 See, e.g., R. Carter Pittman, The "Blessings of Liberty" v. The "Blight of Equality", 42 N.C.
L. REV. 86, 95-97 (1963) (accusing Clark of perjury in his Brown testimony and citing competing
studies that demonstrated that African-American children in segregated schools did better than
those in integrated schools). For Clark's defense, see Kenneth B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases:
Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224 (196o). But see Ernest van den Haag,
Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases - A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6
VILL. L. REV. 69 (1961) (criticizing Clark's article).
Many of Brown's critics questioned the motives of Clark and the other social scientists
whose work the Court cited in Footnote Eleven. Not infrequently, they suggested that Clark and
his fellow social scientists were unpatriotic and perhaps even traitorous. See, e.g., HERMAN E.
TALMADGE, YOU AND SEGREGATION 67 (1955) (attacking the Court's use of studies by social
scientists and asking: "Who ... are these authorities? What is their background? What has been
the nature of their work in this field? . . . What do they really believe?"); James F. Byrnes, The
Supreme Court Must Be Curbed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May i8, 1956, at 5o, 54 (declaring
that "[l]oyal Americans of the North, East, South and West should be outraged that the Supreme
Court would reverse the law of the land upon no authority other than some books written by a
group of psychologists about whose qualifications we know little and about whose loyalty to the
United States there is grave doubt").
51 See, e.g., I.A. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT. SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND THE
DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION 1954-1966, at 62-90 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing the use of scientific
racism by opponents of Brown); PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 188-92 (1972) (discussing the attempts by scientific racists to demonstrate that public
school integration inflicts harm); Hon. William E. Doyle, Can Social Science Data Be Used in
Judicial Decisionmaking?, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 13, 15 (1977) (noting that segregationists are "not nec-
essarily consistent in [their] criticism" in that "having complained about the courts' use of social
science as a basis for unpopular decisions, some urge on the court other, allegedly contrary social
science data, so as to persuade a retreat"); cf. ABRAHAM L. DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA iio-ii (criticizing segregation-
ists who objected to the Court's use of social science while favoring implementation of school
placement acts that called for psychological studies of black schoolchildren wishing to attend all-
white schools).
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In the debates over Brown, "harm" was the catch-all phrase that
encompassed claims advanced in the empirical, scientific, and indi-
viduated register of psychology, as well as sociological claims focusing
on the dignitary and material aspects of subordination. But "harm"
might refer to a variety of other injuries as well. For example, it might
,refer to the psychic effects of the threat to racial privilege that legally
enforced integration posed. Multiplying the harms to which the law
might attend was a way of putting in issue the question whether those
interpreting the Constitution ought to treat the dignitary injuries asso-
ciated with group subordination as constitutionally cognizable harms
at all.
Southern judges advanced this critique in a series of provocative
rulings that performed "massive resistance" in a judicial register.
52 If
Brown turned on findings of harm, these judges would make their own
findings of harm. And so, judges reasoned that laws prohibiting mis-
cegenation did not inflict harm; they prevented harm. This was the
ground on which the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld its
state law prohibiting interracial marriage in Naim v. Naim.53 Louisi-
ana's Supreme Court was even more openly mocking: "[H]alf-breed
children," it reasoned, "have difficulty in being accepted by society, and
there is no doubt that children in such a situation are burdened, as has
been said in another connection, with 'a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
52 For accounts of Southern resistance to the Brown decision, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE
RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950'S
(i969); NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64 (1971); THE MODERATES' DILEMMA: MASSIVE
RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA (Matthew D. Lassiter & Andrew B.
Lewis eds., 1998); Raymond T. Diamond, Confrontation as Rejoinder to Compromise: Reflections
on the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis, i i NAT'L BLACK L.J. I51 (1989); James L. Hunt, Brown
v. Board of Education After Fifty Years: Context and Synopsis, 52 MERCER L. REV. 549 (2001);
Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenes from the Southside: A Desegregation Drama in Five Acts, 19 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 327 (1997); and Carl Tobias, Public School Desegregation in Virginia Dur-
ing the Post-Brown Decade, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV 1261 (1996).
53 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). The court reasoned:
Brown v. Board of Education reached its conclusion that segregation in the public
schools was contrary to the Equal Protection clause on the basis that education is per-
haps the most important function of State and local governments, "the very foundation
of good citizenship[,"] and that the opportunity to acquire it, "where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." No
such claim for the intermarriage of the races could be supported; by no sort of valid rea-
soning could it be found to be a foundation of good citizenship or a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms. In the opinion of the legislatures of more than half
the States it is harmful to good citizenship.
Id. at 754-55 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493), vacated by
350 U.S. 891 0955), reaff'd on remand, 9o S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956), recall of mandate denied, 350
U.S. 985 (1956).
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way unlikely ever to be undone.' '5 4  Other courts limited Brown's
holding by emphasizing that the factual findings on which it rested
concerned the harmful consequences of segregation in education only.
55
In ruling that Brown's holding did not call into question segregation in
public beaches and bathhouses, a federal district court in Maryland re-
lied in part on the argument that "[alt the present stage of social devel-
opment in the State of Maryland, most (but not all) Negroes are more
relaxed and feel more at home among members of their own race than
in a mixed group of Negroes and whites; the same is true of whites. '
56
If the Supreme Court intended to dismantle Jim Crow on the ground
that it harmed blacks, Southern whites would demonstrate that the
project of dismantling Jim Crow would itself inflict harm, on blacks
and whites alike.
Southerners joined the conversation about harm to demonstrate
that assertions about sociological facts were indeterminate and partial,
and hence an illegitimate ground for a decision that claimed the au-
thority of constitutional law. Brown's critics assailed the Court as "the
nine sociologists" and accused the justices of "writing Gunnar Myrdal's
'social dynamics' into the Constitution. '" s5 When the Georgia Legisla-
ture claimed to impeach several Supreme Court Justices in 1957, it
condemned Brown on the ground that the Court "ha[d] expressly
predicated its determination of the rights of the people of the several
sovereign states of the American union upon the psychological conclu-
sions of Kotinsky, Brameld and Myrdal, and their ilk, rather than the
legal conclusions of Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, Brandeis and their
54 State v. Brown, 108 So. 2d 233, 234 (La. 1959) (emphasis added) (quoting Brown, 347 U.S.
at 494) (finding that interracial children are so burdened by social opprobrium that Brown's rea-
soning dictated the preservation of antimiscegenation statutes).
55 Courts reasoned in this fashion about questions other than the constitutionality of antimis-
cegenation statutes. See, e.g., Flemming v. S.C. Elec. & Gas. Co., 128 F. Supp. 469, 470 (E.D.S.C.
1955) (finding that Brown did not overrule segregation in public transportation because such seg-
regation could not be said to meet Brown's harm-based principle), rev'd per curiam, 224 F.2d 752
(4 th Cir. I955), cert. denied, 35, U.S. 901 (1956); id. ("The whole basis of the decision is the
claimed adverse effect which segregation has on the educational and mental development of negro
children, or as otherwise stated, 'the children of the minority group[.'] Certainly, no such effect
can be legitimately claimed in the field of bus transportation."); Lonesome v. Maxwell, 123 F.
Supp. 193, 205-06 (D. Md. 1954) (ruling that segregation in public beaches and bathhouses was
not proscribed by Brown), rev'd sub nom. Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 220
F.2d 386, aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); see also New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v.
Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (rejecting the defendant's claim that under
Brown, the question whether the city could segregate a park turned on psychological considera-
tions not addressed in that case, and thus requiring factual inquiry that precluded summary
judgment), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 0958); infra pp. 1496-97 (discussing Stell).
56 Lonesome, 123 F. Supp. at 202.
57 Herbert Garfinkel, Social Science Evidence and the School Segregation Cases, 21 J. POL.
37, 37 (1959); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
48 (2ooo) (observing how the use of social science "left the Court vulnerable to the southern accu-
sation of abandoning law").
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contemporaries upon the bench. '5 8 The Georgia Legislature was echo-
ing the so-called Southern Manifesto, a "Declaration of Constitutional
Principles" signed the preceding year by ninety-six members of Con-
gress who claimed that the Court had substituted its "personal political
and social ideas for the established law of the land," denouncing
Brown as "the fruit always produced when men substitute naked
power for established law."'5 9
C. Massive Resistance and the "Neutral Principles" Debate
The force of Southern attacks on Brown can be felt in Herbert
Wechsler's famous Neutral Principles article, which framed the prob-
lem of judicial legitimacy in some of the same language as the South-
ern Manifesto. 60  To "function otherwise than as a naked power or-
gan,"6 1 Wechsler argued, a court must ground its judgments in
principled decisions:
A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on rea-
sons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their general-
ity and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is in-
volved .... Otherwise, as Holmes said in his first opinion for the Court, "a
constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of
right, .. . would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or eco-
nomical opinions .... 62
Wechsler's quest for constitutional principles "that rest[] on reasons
... that in their generality and neutrality transcend any immediate re-
sult" would seem to be a quest to find reasons that do not draw dis-
tinctions among, or decide cases by reference to, identifiable social
groups. He urged that constitutional decisions must rest on reasons
58 Impeachment of Certain U.S. Supreme Court Justices, J. Res. Gen. Assem. No. ioo, H. Res.
No. 174 -554 d § 4 (Ga. I957), http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/I957resn-9.htm.
59 The Decision of the Supreme Court in the School Cases - Declaration of Constitutional
Principles, 1O2 CONG. REC. 4459, 446o (1956) (statement signed by nineteen Senators and sev-
enty-seven Representatives); see also Snyder, supra note 14, at 398 ("The most consistent evidence
of this Brown backlash was in the Senate. In March of 1956, nineteen of twenty-two southern
senators and eighty-two of io6 southern representatives signed the Southern Manifesto that de-
nounced Brown as a 'clear abuse of judicial power' and advocated resistance 'by any lawful
means."').
60 Barry Friedman ties the Wechsler article to Southern reaction to Brown and gives a rich
account of the debate over legitimacy that Wechsler sparked. See Barry Friedman, Neutral Prin-
ciples: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 (1997).
61 Wechsler, supra note 13, at 19. Philip Kurland also echoed the "naked power" language,
directly referring to the Court's critics. Judicial activism "should be rejected," he wrote, "because
the exercise of such naked power invites a reply in kind from those on whose domain the Court is
poaching." Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics, 6 UTAH L. REX. 457,
466 0959).
62 Wechsler, supra note 13, at 19 (third omission in original) (quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S.
6o6, 609 (1903)).
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other than the interpreter's "sympathy" for the claims of contending
social groups:
The man who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may
not realize that his position implies that the courts are free to function
as a naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them, as
ambivalently he so often does, as courts of law. If he may know he disap-
proves of a decision when all he knows is that it has sustained a claim put
forward by a labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro or a segregationist, a cor-
poration or a Communist - he acquiesces in the proposition that a man
of different sympathy but equal information may no less properly conclude
that he approves.
63
Wechsler drew considerable attention in Northern legal circles
when he pronounced himself unable to find a neutral principle on
which the Court could have decided Brown. What moved him to this
view was the judgment that in Brown the Court concerned itself with
harms suffered by a particular social group. Wechsler's criticism of
the opinion internalized at a very deep level the criticisms of Brown
advanced by Southerners. Wechsler argued that the Brown decision
did not rest on the factual finding that "separation harms the Negro
children who may be involved, '64 demonstrating this point by attack-
ing Footnote Eleven's logic in terms that echoed the reasoning of the
Southern judges in the cases we have just examined. 65  Wechsler then
offered his best understanding of Brown: that the decision rested on
the view "that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to
the minority against whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not
dominant politically and, therefore, does not make the choice in-
63 Id. at 12.
64 Id. at 32.
65 Wechsler seemed to adopt as his own the kinds of questions the resisting Southern judges
aimed at Brown:
Does the validity of the decision turn then on the sufficiency of evidence or of judi-
cial notice to sustain a finding that the separation harms the Negro children who may be
involved? There were, indeed, some witnesses who expressed that opinion in the Kan-
sas case, as there were also witnesses in the companion Virginia case .... Much de-
pended on the question that the witness had in mind, which rarely was explicit. Was he
comparing the position of the Negro child in a segregated school with his position in an
integrated school where he was happily accepted and regarded by the whites; or was he
comparing his position under separation with that under integration where the whites
were hostile to his presence and found ways to make their feelings known? And if the
harm that segregation worked was relevant, what of the benefits that it entailed: sense
of security, the absence of hostility? Were they irrelevant? Moreover, was the finding in
Topeka applicable without more to Clarendon County, South Carolina, with 2,799 col-
ored students and only 295 whites? Suppose that more Negroes in a community pre-
ferred separation than opposed it? Would that be relevant to whether they were hurt or
aided by segregation as opposed to integration? Their fates would be governed by the
change of system quite as fully as those of the students who complained.
Id. at 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
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volved. ' '66  On Wechsler's account, then, Brown was concerned with
the harm of group subordination: Brown condemned segregation as a
practice by which a group with political power denied equality to a
group lacking political power. It was this antisubordination under-
standing of Brown that Wechsler argued could not be grounded in
neutral principles. He first invoked Plessy to question whether the
dignitary injuries of subordination were constitutionally cognizable; 67
he then asserted that a court that undertook to adjudicate a dignitary
claim of subordination would in fact be choosing between the associa-
tional liberties (and hedonic claims) of two groups. 68 Wechsler ex-
pressed this point as follows:
[1]f the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces
an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant....
Given a situation where the state must practically choose between denying
the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those
who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that
the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail? I
should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the
opinion. To write it is for me the challenge of the school-segregation
cases.
69
As Robert Bork later observed, Wechsler had framed the problem so
that Brown "require[d] a judicial choice between rival gratifications in
order to find a fundamental human right. So viewed it ... is not sus-
ceptible of principled resolution."7 0
Wechsler's challenge elicited a storm of response. An array of
prominent critics moved to demonstrate that the claims of blacks and
whites were not commensurable and that it was possible to make a
principled choice between them; at a deeper level, these critics were
contesting the conception of neutrality Wechsler had employed to im-
66 Id. at 33.
67 See id. ("Is it alternatively defensible to make the measure of validity of legislation the way
it is interpreted by those who are affected by it? In the context of a charge that segregation with
equal facilities is a denial of equality, is there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if 'en-
forced separation stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority' it is solely because its mem-
bers choose 'to put that construction upon it'?" (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551
(1896))).
68 See id. at 34 ("[Tlhe question posed by state-enforced segregation is not one of discrimina-
tion at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the
state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any groups or races that
may be involved."); cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-I96o: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 268 (1992) ("Like the consensus theory from
which it was drawn, the neutral principles school sought to avoid ever having to decide whether
one group was victimizing another, since that inevitably involved substantive evaluation of the
justice of their respective claims.").
69 Wechsler, supra note 13, at 34.
70 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. i,
14 ('970.
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pugn the Brown decision. Louis Pollak famously set about redrafting
Brown to meet Wechsler's challenge. To minimize the burden of prov-
ing facts "[o]n the issue of the reasonableness of governmentally im-
posed distinctions between whites and Negroes, as well as on the issue
of whether harm accrues to either group through enforced separa-
tion,' 71 Pollak read Korematsu 72 and Carolene Products' Footnote
Four 73 as creating a legal presumption against "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group. '74 Invoking this
presumption to reduce the factual showing required,75 the remainder
of Pollak's Brown opinion made the case that the "degrading effects"
of Jim Crow legislation imposed a particular kind of harm on blacks:7 6
"We see little room for doubt that it is the function of Jim Crow laws
to make identification as a Negro a matter of stigma. Such govern-
mental denigration is a form of injury the Constitution recognizes and
will protect against."77  He concluded by observing that "it was 'the
apprehended existence of prejudice' by whites against Negroes that led
to adoption of the equal protection clause." '78 Pollak, in other words,
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting state policies
that inflicted the kinds of status harm that whites had historically in-
flicted on blacks.
Yet even as Pollak stressed that Brown could be justified as vindi-
cating "neutral constitutional principles,"7 9  he took issue with
Wechsler's claim that, to be law, the Constitution had to be construed
in terms of principles that were neutral in group salience. "[T]he deci-
sive constitutional principles here relevant are in a vital sense not neu-
tral," Pollak argued.80 "The three post-Civil War Amendments were
fashioned to one major end - an end to which we are only now mak-
ing substantial strides - the full emancipation of the Negro[.]"'81 The
71 Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, io8 U. PA. L. REV. I, 26-27 (I959).
72 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (I944).
73 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
74 Pollak, supra note 71, at 27 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
75 See id. (observing that with such a presumption a court "could not.., sustain the reason-
ableness of these racial distinctions and the absence of harm said to flow from them, unless [it
was] prepared to say that no factual case can be made the other way").
76 See id. at 27-28 ("The Jim Crow laws, unlike feudal laws, did not assign the subordinate
group a fixed status in society. They were constantly pushing the Negro farther down." (quoting
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 93 0955)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
77 Id. at 28.
78 Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303, 309 (879)). For related observations,
see source cited infra note 88.
79 Pollak, supra note 71, at 31.
80 Id. (emphasis added).
81 Id.
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nation had adopted the Equal Protection Clause as the culmination of
a civil war over black slavery, and so would vindicate the constitu-
tional value of equal protection precisely as it emancipated blacks
from enslavement. In other words, vindicating principled commit-
ments in history could well involve attention to particular groups.
Pollak was joined in this view by Charles Black, who also read the
Fourteenth Amendment as embodying "a broad principle of practical
equality for the Negro race, inconsistent with any device that in fact
relegates the Negro race to a position of inferiority. ''82 Black under-
stood the Fourteenth Amendment as repudiating governmental prac-
tices that enforced the subordinate status of blacks; Brown was thus
an easy case.83 Black confronted the group salience of an antisubordi-
nation commitment unflinchingly, asserting there were reasons of value
as well as history for elaborating the meaning of equal protection in
terms that focused on the claims of blacks: "Freedom from the massive
wrong of segregation entails a corresponding loss of freedom on the
part of the whites who must now associate with Negroes on public oc-
casions," he wrote, suggesting that there were "constitutional reasons
for preferring the Negroes' desire for merged participation in public
life to the white man's desire to live a public life without Negroes in
proximity. '8 4 He continued: "When the directive of equality cannot be
followed without displeasing the white, then something that can be
called a 'freedom' of the white must be impaired."8s Alexander Bickel
concurred with Pollak and Black, reasoning that equality was a prin-
ciple concerned with status differences among groups:
What, on the score of generality and neutrality, is wrong with the principle
that a legislative choice in favor of a freedom not to associate is forbidden,
when the consequence of such a choice is to place one of the groups of
which our society is constituted in a position of permanent, humiliating in-
feriority; when the consequence beyond that is to foster in the whites, by
authority of the state, self-damaging and potentially violent feelings of ra-
cial superiority... ?86
In short, commitment to a principle embodying a particular choice of
values - for example, opposition to caste - could lead those inter-
preting the Constitution to prefer the associational claims of blacks to
82 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 42 1, 429-
30 (g6o).
83 See id. at 421 ("First, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment should be
read as saying that the Negro race, as such, is not to be significantly disadvantaged by the laws of
the states. Secondly, segregation is a massive intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race, as
such, by state law. No subtlety at all.").
84 Id. at 428.
85 Id. at 429.
86 BICKEL, supra note 43, at 57.
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those of whites.8 7  As Pollak subsequently put it, "judges must identify
the competing values, must estimate the value consequences of prefer-
ring one set of competing values to another and must choose."88
Thus, scholars who defended antisubordination values as a legiti-
mate ground on which to choose between the welfare claims of whites
and blacks were contesting Wechsler's conception of neutrality.8 9 Oth-
ers questioned the standard of neutrality itself, arguing that Wechsler
had fundamentally misconceived the practice of adjudication. "Adher-
ence to neutral principles, in the sense of principles which do not refer
to value choices," Arthur Miller and Ronald Howell argued, "is impos-
sible in the constitutional adjudicative process." 90 Law was purposive,
embodying commitments, values, and aims, adopted in concrete social
contexts. For this reason, Martin Shapiro observed, legal principles
had group salience:
It is the town drunk not the town banker who will in case after case raise
the issue of police brutality. The litigant attacking racially discriminatory
practices will generally be a Negro and his courtroom opponent a white
Protestant American. The separation of litigant from cause tends to be
another flight to that fictional land where legal issues present themselves
abstracted from social and political situations.91
Yet even as an array of prominent scholars rose to Brown's defense
and identified many defects in the way Wechsler reasoned about the
87 Cf id. at 6o ("To be sure, Mr. Wechsler is right when he assumes that a very considerable
degree of unwanted association will be forced on the whites, because vast numbers of them have
no practical alternative to using the public schools and other public facilities. This much restric-
tion on the freedom not to associate necessarily inheres in the principle that decided the Segrega-
tion Cases, and it is a considerable one.").
88 Louis H. Pollak, Constitutional Adjudication: Relative or Absolute Neutrality, II J. PUB. L.
48, 58 (1962); see also id. at 62 ("At most [the Court's] cumulative holdings collectively proclaim
the invalidity of measures dividing the races with hostile purpose and effect. A broader ruling -
one which sought 'to outlaw race or color as determinants of all official action' - would have
been uncalled for by any issue which the Court has thus far faced." (footnote omitted)).
89 In an article entitled The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral, Benjamin Wright impatiently
asked:
The fourteenth amendment was enacted to protect rights of a racial minority. So much,
at least, is clear. Is the principle of minority rights a "neutral" principle? If so, which
minority is protected by them? Are there not distinctions to be made, and an order of
values or rights to be defended? Does Mr. Wechsler mean to imply that all persons in
the racial groups involved must emerge with their rights of association unimpaired in
order for the Court's action to be defensible - or "neutral?"
Benjamin F. Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral, 40 TEX. L. REV. 599, 607 (1962).
90 Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 66i, 664 (ig6o); see also id. at 687 ("[Wechsler and Henry Hart's] position
is bottomed on a theory of a fundamental harmony of interests of all members of the American
community. But that is precisely what may not be present in most important constitutional litiga-
tion, such as racial relations, where disagreement is over ends or goals and not the means or tac-
tics to attain them .... ").
91 Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neu-
tral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV 587, 597 (1963).
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law of equal protection and depicted the practice of constitutional ad-
judication, the deluge of responses testified to the urgency of the ques-
tions he raised. Wechsler had touched a raw nerve. His article and
the outpouring of scholarly response suggest that Southern assaults
succeeded in calling into question Brown's reasoning. The argument
that the Court's use of social science evidence was arbitrary or biased
cut deep because it carried within it precisely the objection Wechsler
raised - the objection that, in treating as constitutionally significant
the dignitary injury that segregation inflicted on blacks, Brown unjus-
tifiably preferred the welfare claims of blacks over those of whites.
Black, Pollak, and Bickel sought to demonstrate that this preference
was justified; in their view, constitutional history and principle clearly
counseled the value choices the judiciary ought to make.
Yet others were less confident about a jurisprudence that would
make those value choices so transparent, given the way Southern
whites were challenging the Court's authority to intervene in the re-
gion's race relations. It was jarring enough for the federal judiciary to
unsettle deeply rooted racial expectations by condemning longstanding
practices of segregation; why further provoke Southern whites by justi-
fying the decision on the ground that constitutional principles valued
the kinds of claims that blacks were making over those advanced by
whites? Moved by this concern, friendly critics of Brown began to call
for a new way of reasoning about the constitutionality of racial segre-
gation, one that would protect the Court from the charge that it had
privileged the interests of blacks over whites. As one scholar put it:
Professor Pollak, as well as others, has interpreted the Brown opinion
as standing for the proposition that racial segregation in education denies
Negroes the equal protection of the laws solely because it "harms" them by
generating in them feelings of inferiority. Professor Wechsler has recog-
nized that this is a possible construction. This view leads to difficult prob-
lems such as whether a legislature can balance "harms" of this nature
against other "harms" arguably visited on whites by desegregation and
conclude, consistent with the Constitution, that segregation causes the
fewest "harms," or that Negro children would be more "harmed" by deseg-
regation than by continued segregation. Perhaps the mere presence of such




By assuming it is necessary to show that the inequality in school segrega-
tion is psychologically harmful, civil rights proponents have, unwittingly,
weakened the protection afforded by the Constitution. Advocates of racial
segregation, since the 1954 decision, have argued that there is personality
92 Ira Michael Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49
CAL. L. REV. 104, 1 io (I96I) (footnotes omitted).
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damage to white children forced to mix with persons they consider obnox-
ious. The Court, by entertaining the psychological argument in support of
its decision, opened the way for this sort of rebuttal. However, these crit-
ics maintain, inequality is constitutionally proscribed whether it is harmful
or not. The decision, therefore, must be based on constitutional grounds
and not on social science.
93
There were, in short, scholars who firmly supported the Court's deseg-
regation jurisprudence, yet still took Wechsler's criticisms to heart.
The Court could not afford to rest its equal protection jurisprudence
on grounds that appeared to choose between the welfare claims of con-
tending social groups.
Martin Shapiro joined these calls for a more politically attentive
race jurisprudence. Shapiro emphasized how important it was for the
Court to exert its authority in ways that took into account the need to
preserve its own legitimacy, and he took Wechsler's critics to task as
insufficiently inattentive to such considerations: "It would be fantastic
indeed if the Supreme Court in the name of sound scholarship were to
publicly disavow the myth upon which its power rests," Shapiro noted,
caustically observing that "[i]n so far as the standardists' writings are
to be taken as counsel to the Court on how its opinions should be writ-
ten, they seem to constitute sound political advice. '94  On Shapiro's
account, it was the realists who were naive:
It is true that those who attack the concept of neutral principles do so by
stressing the political role of the Court. But they have been so fascinated
by the Court as political actor that they have forgotten that it is also acted
upon politically. The almost instinctive habit of viewing the Court as a
thing apart reasserts itself in concern about what the Court can do to oth-
ers but not for what others can do to it. Those who favor neutral princi-
ples have been worrying about what others can do to it. Thus in many
ways they have been more politically perceptive than their opponents....
.•. If the Court is to be successful as a political actor, it must have the




Proponents of the new or political jurisprudence must listen to their oppo-
nents - not to counter their apolitical arguments - but to take account
of the political facts which those arguments represent. To put it bluntly,
the real problem is how the Supreme Court can pursue its policy goals
without violating those popular and professional expectations of "neutral-
ity" which are. an important factor in our legal tradition and a principal
source of the Supreme Court's prestige. It is in these terms, not in terms of
93 Garfinkel, supra note 57, at 42.
94 Shapiro, supra note 91, at 6oi.
95 Id. at 603.
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the philosophic, jurisprudential, or historical correctness of the concept of
neutral principles, that the debate should now proceed.
96
As Shapiro recognized, the Court vindicated constitutional values
in concrete social contexts and so would inevitably act on the basis of
group-salient principles. 97 This realist account of constitutional adju-
dication identified a complex challenge for an institution whose au-
thority was defined in significant part by the expectation that it stood
outside of politics.
D. Massive Resistance and the Shift from Harm to Classification Talk
The assault on Footnote Eleven as it reverberated through North-
ern academic circles dramatized the importance of the justification the
Court offered for interfering with segregated institutions in the South.
These concerns seem to have played a role in the rise of classification
talk in the I96os, the period when the Court began to organize equal
protection doctrine around the strict scrutiny framework adopted in
McLaughlin v. Florida98 and Loving v. Virginia.99
In this period, Southern resistance to Brown had not abated. In
the Fifth Circuit, for example, a number of defendants sought to reliti-
gate Brown, arguing that the Supreme Court's opinion rested on an er-
roneous finding of fact. In Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board
of Education,100 a Georgia district court earned notoriety by conduct-
ing a trial on such claims, finding that integration was more harmful
than segregation, 10 1 and holding "that a classification based on racial
traits directly concerned with proficiency and mental health is a rea-
sonable one within the intendment of the equal protection provisions
96 Id. at 605-o6 (emphasis added). For a wide-ranging rejoinder to Shapiro, see Jan G.
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and
Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968).
97 See supra p. 1494.
98 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
99 388 U.S. i (1967).
10 22o F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963) (determining that Brown had turned on a factual finding
that segregation resulted in harm to African-American children, considering the weight of the
supporting evidence in Brown and the contradictory evidence entered by the defendants in the
case at bar, and determining that there was no credible evidence that segregation harmed black
children), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
101 The Court found:
[I]t has been established without contradiction, that selective association is a universal
human trait; that physically observable racial differences form the basis for preferential
association and that patterns of racial preference are formed and firmly established at a
pre-school age.
... The effects of intergroup association are reasonably predictable on the basis of
that branch of psychology known as social dynamics. ...
... In each city referred to in the evidence where large scale integration had taken
place or had existed continuously, the predicted level or even a greater degree of conflict
existed and substantially impaired the efficacy of the entire educational system.
Id. at 683-84.
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of the Constitution."102 Despite a Fifth Circuit opinion rebuffing this
challenge to Brown,10 3 such claims continued.1
0 4
In this climate, there was open discussion of classification discourse
as having the virtue of cooling debate. A constitutional regime that
treated racial classification as presumptively irrational would legiti-
mate Brown by deflecting attention away from social struggle over the
kinds of injury to which equal protection doctrine ought to be respon-
sive. The proponents of this view, as Owen Fiss described them in
1965, argued for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in accor-
dance with "the more 'neutral' or 'general' principle that race is an
inherently arbitrary classification.'10 5  Fiss traced the "inherently-
arbitrary-classification principle" back to the presumption in Louis
Pollak's Brown opinion that a law that "'draws racial lines' treats the
racial minority unequally" - a presumption designed, Fiss observed,
to relieve the Court "from having to rely openly on the empirical
judgment that segregation disadvantages the minority."0 6
Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge John Minor Wisdom, the great
architect of Southern desegregation,1 7 endorsed this recharacterization
of Brown in his influential Jefferson County opinion. 0 8 In the course
of upholding the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's
guidelines for enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Judge
Wisdom argued that challenges to Brown's findings about the harms
of segregation during the decade since the decision was handed down
now counseled a different approach, one in which courts would con-
102 Id. at 681.
103 See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
104 See Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Evers, 357 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 1966) ("[A]t this
late date, bewitched and bewildered by the popular myth that Brown was decided for sociological
reasons untested in a trial, the defendants and interveners attempt to overturn Brown on a factual
showing. They assert that innate differences in the races in their aptitude for educability are a
reasonable basis for classifying children by race, demonstrate that separate schools for Negro
children are to the advantage of both races, and justify continued school segregation in Missis-
sippi." (footnote omitted)).
105 Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78
HARV. L. REV. 564, 591 (1965).
106 Id. at 591. On Pollak's use of the presumption, see supra p. 1492.
107 For accounts of Judge Wisdom's role in the battle over desegregation, see David J. Garrow,
Visionaries of the Law: John Minor Wisdom and Frank M. Johnson, Jr., lo9 YALE L.J. 1219
(2ooo); and sources cited infra note io8.
108 See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 845-47 (5th Cir. 1966)
(upholding the desegregation standards of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in
light of Brown and the Civil Rights Act of 1964). For discussion of Jefferson County's historical
significance, see JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 297-310 (1981); HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 196o-1972, at
372-74 (I99O), which discusses the case's significance in ushering in a new era of enforcement fo-
cused on integrationist goals; J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE
SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978, at 111-18 (1979); and Jack Bass,
John Minor Wisdom and the Impact of Law, 69 MISS. L.J. 25 (1999).
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demn "state-imposed separation by race [as] an invidious classification
and for that reason alone .. unconstitutional. '"10 9 Drawing on the
work of Wechsler, Pollak, Black, and Fiss, l10 as well as Supreme Court
precedent in the years after Brown, Judge Wisdom observed:
The Brown I finding that segregated schooling causes psychological
harm and denies equal educational opportunities should not be construed
as the sole basis for the decision. So construed, the way would be open for
proponents of the status quo to attempt to show, on the facts, that integra-
tion may be harmful or the greater of two evils. Indeed that narrow view
of Brown I has led several district courts into error. We think that the
judgment "must have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in prin-
ciple, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed."
The relief Brown II requires rests on recognition of the principle that
state-imposed separation by race is an invidious classification and for that
reason alone is unconstitutional. Classifications based upon race are espe-
cially suspect, since they are "odi[o]us to a free people". In short, compul-
sory separation, apartheid, is per se discriminatory against Negroes. 1 '
For Judge Wisdom, changing the way the courts expressed the
principle at the heart of equal protection law did not reflect a change
of values so much as a sober judgment about the best means of vindi-
cating such values when a substantial number of citizens were contest-
ing the legitimacy of judicial decrees endeavoring to give such values
practical force. Because "proponents of the status quo""' 2 could ap-
propriate harm talk to defend the status quo, Judge Wisdom advo-
cated the use of classification talk to redress the harms of which
Brown spoke. In proposing to characterize segregation as an invidious
classification that was "per se discriminatory against Negroes,"
1 13
Judge Wisdom was seeking to end the debate about Brown's rationale
by declaring that segregation was a per se constitutional wrong.
Thus, in the period when the Supreme Court adopted the strict
scrutiny framework and began to emphasize classification as the core
of the equal protection violation in Brown, many understood the pre-
sumption against racial classification as a strategy for insulating a
body of constitutional law concerned with status harm inflicted on
blacks against unremitting charges of jurisprudential illegitimacy.
109 Jefferson County, 372 F.2d at 871-72.
110 See id. at 871 & nn.73, 75-76.
111 Id. at 871-72 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wechsler, supra note 13, at 33; and Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
112 Id. at 871.
113 Id. at 872; see id. ("A number of post-Brown per curiam decisions not involving education
make it clear that the broad dimensions of the rationale are not circumscribed by the necessity of
showing harmful inequality to the individual.").
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II. BROWN'S REACH: NORTHERN DE FACTO SEGREGATION
DEBATES OF THE 1960S AND 1970S
As we have seen, in the years after Brown, massive resistance ig-
nited urgent debate about the kinds of reason-giving that would best
preserve the Court's authority to declare the Constitution's meaning.
The attacks on Brown during the 195os did not merely reverberate in
the academy; they seem to have played an important role in shaping
the development of equal protection doctrine during the I96Os, when
the Court began to elaborate equal protection doctrine in the language
in which it is still couched today. It is, of course, impossible to say
how large a role the assault on Footnote Eleven played in the Court's
decision to adopt a strict scrutiny framework for analyzing equal pro-
tection claims. What does seem clear, however, is that in announcing
and applying the new framework to two cases involving antimiscege-
nation statutes, the Court refrained from discussing, as it had in
Brown, the dignitary harms that Jim Crow laws inflicted on blacks.
Treating racial classification as presumptively unconstitutional, as the
Court did in McLaughlin and Loving, obviated the need for such dis-
cussions. That was the presumption's point.
Yet even as the Court embraced the doctrinal presumption that ra-
cial classification was unconstitutional in the mid-ig6os, anticlassifica-
tion discourse did not then have the properties we have since come to
associate with it. In the i96os, questions of anticlassification and
questions of group status harm were not bifurcated frames of analysis,
as they would later come to be. Anticlassification discourse acquired
this new significance only as it was asked to solve a variety of new
questions in the conflicts over implementing Brown in the North.
As the debate about de facto school segregation raised different
kinds of questions for equal protection doctrine, it drew anticlassifica-
tion discourse into new forms of conflict. How did Brown apply in
Northern school districts where there was no openly race-based policy
of school assignment, but where schools were nonetheless segregated?
Could the school board take race-conscious measures to improve racial
balance? Did the Constitution permit this? Did the Constitution re-
quire this? The injunction against classifying on the basis of race ac-
quired its shape and features as a principle as Americans wrestled
with racially hot questions such as these.
In the debates over de facto segregation in the 196os, one can see
anticlassification discourse acting both to advance and to limit anti-
subordination aims, with the two forms of reasoning finally assuming
familiar form as agonistic principles in the affirmative action debates
of the early 197os. These debates echo the debates over Footnote
Eleven in their attention to questions concerning the Constitution's re-
sponsiveness to competing claims of group harm, but they also illus-
trate at a deep level the institutionalization of Brown's project in the
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intervening decades. Examining the struggles over classification and
harm in the de facto segregation debates of this period supplies an il-
luminating frame for last Term's decision in Grutter.
A. The Presumption Against Racial Classification:
Status Harm in a New Idiom
By the mid-I96os, the Court had considerably more authority to
pronounce its judgments. The Court had faced down direct defiance
in Little Rock.' 1 4  The civil rights movement's efforts to enforce and
expand Brown through boycotts and sit-ins elicited violent opposition
in the South, which in turn began to discredit Southern resistance and
build sympathy for the movement in the North.' 1 5  As protests contin-
ued, a broad-based bipartisan coalition in Congress enacted the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which provided democratic legitimation of Brown
and practical tools to enforce the decision.' 16 These changes were en-
acted in popular culture: Harper Lee's bestselling i96o novel To Kill a
Mockingbird won the Pulitzer Prize and was adapted into an ac-
claimed movie. Later in the decade, Hollywood depictions of interra-
cial friendship (in the hit TV show I Spy, which debuted in 1965) and
romance (in the blockbuster 1967 movie Guess Who's Coming to Din-
114 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
115 For accounts of protest actions of the civil rights movement in the early I96Os, see ADAM
FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY, 189O-2ooo, at 241-47, 252-
56, 273-79, 280-93 (2oo1), which describes the sit-ins of i96o, the freedom rides of i96I, the pro-
tests in Birmingham of 1963, the 1963 March on Washington, Freedom Summer, and the voting
registration efforts in Selma. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMER-
ICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988); TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN
THE KING YEARS 1963-65 (1998).
As the civil rights movement anticipated, Southern efforts to repress protest built sympathy
for the movement in the North. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the
Civil Rights Movement, 8o VA. L. REV. 7, 141 (1994) ("[T]he Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions were spurred into action when the nation - including, most significantly, northern whites
- was appalled to witness the spectacle of southern law enforcement officials brutally suppress-
ing generally nonviolent civil rights demonstrations. The nation was made painfully aware,
through the immediacy of television coverage, of the cruel excesses of Jim Crow; the response was
a wave of indignation that such behavior could be tolerated in mid-twentieth-century America.");
see also MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 354 (i99o) (noting that Martin Luther King, Jr. "had discovered how
to use television to make the protests of blacks irresistibly appealing to the large majority of the
American people who were mostly indifferent to segregation when it remained distant but dis-
liked it when forced to face the unpleasant measures needed to maintain it"); Robert J. Norrell,
One Thing We Did Right: Reflections on the Movement, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS
STUDIES 72 (Armstead L. Robinson & Patricia Sullivan eds., i99i) (noting that televised images
of white Southerners attacking peaceful protesters "caused a mass revulsion from racial violence
that aided the civil rights cause immeasurably").
116 See GRAHAM, supra note io8, at 141-45 (discussing the cross-party alliance required to de-
feat the Southern filibuster of the civil rights bill); id. at 373-74 (discussing enforcement of deseg-
regation orders under Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act).
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ner) reached wide audiences.1 17  With these legal, political, and cul-
tural developments, the Court was ready to address the antimiscegena-
tion statutes that it had avoided in the 1950s.
But even as the Court acquired the authority to address the consti-
tutionality of antimiscegenation statutes, it began to speak about equal
protection in a different, and perhaps more cautious, voice. It was in
two cases involving antimiscegenation statutes - one criminalizing in-
terracial cohabitation and the other criminalizing interracial marriage
- that the Court first announced that equal protection required strict
scrutiny of state action that classifies on the basis of race. McLaughlin
v. Florida""s built the strict scrutiny framework on longstanding doc-
trines of reasonable classification and on Fifth Amendment precedents
that condemned racial classification. Reconstructed in this way, judg-
ments about equal protection now focused on the wrong of legislative
classification rather than the harm of segregation:
Normally, the widest discretion is allowed the legislative judgment in
determining whether to attack some, rather than all, of the manifestations
of the evil aimed at; and normally that judgment is given the benefit of
every conceivable circumstance which might suffice to characterize the
classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary and invidious.... But
we deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants,
which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination
emanating from official sources in the States. This strong policy renders
racial classifications "constitutionally suspect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 [(I954)]; and subject to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 [(1944)]; and "in most circumstances ir-
relevant" to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabaya-
shi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, IOO [(1943)].119
The Court concluded by observing that "racial classifications have
been held invalid in a variety of contexts," citing Brown, among other
cases. 120
117 See DONALD BOGLE, PRIMETIME BLUES: AFRICAN AMERICANS ON NETWORK
TELEVISION 115-25 (2001) (describing the groundbreaking success of I Spy); RANDALL
KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 10 4 -
08 (2003) (discussing the cultural influence of Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?); Bryan K. Fair,
Using Parrots To Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution and Wrongful Conviction in
Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 403, 403-04 (1994) (observing that To Kill a Mockingbird's commer-
cial and critical success extended to the South). While Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?, which
was released the year Loving was decided, is still the best-known Hollywood representation of
interracial marriage, the first film to treat the topic was One Potato, Two Potato, an independent
film released in 1964. See DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATTOES, MAMMIES, AND
BUCKS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILMS 201 (1973).
118 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
119 Id. at i91-92.
120 Id. at 192 (citations omitted).
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This justification for invalidating the antimiscegenation statute was
"cool," not "hot." It transformed the constitutional question into a
problem concerning the instrumental rationality of regulation. More-
over, as Louis Pollak appreciated, designating racial classification as a
presumptively unconstitutional, "suspect" practice relieved the Court
of the burden of analyzing the racial logic of the regulation, in any but
the most abstract form. By invoking a strong presumption against ra-
cial classifications, the Court could decide McLaughlin without dis-
cussing the state's infliction of dignitary harms. (Compare McLaugh-
lin's citation of Brown with Brown itself, which declared that "[t]o
separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."1 2 1 ) In McLaughlin, the Court could have
discussed the social meanings expressed by the prohibition on interra-
cial cohabitation, or the importance of extending constitutional protec-
tion to the persons on whom the prohibition inflicted dignitary harm,
as it had in Brown. Doing so would have involved the Court in de-
scribing the status relations enforced, and the status harms inflicted,
by the prohibition on interracial intimacy - the explosive heart of Jim
Crow itself. But after a decade of assault on the harm-based claims
associated with Footnote Eleven, the Court did not employ this form
of talk in McLaughlin. Rather than explain how the white commu-
nity's prohibition on interracial intimacy demeaned blacks, the Court
instead embraced a rule against racial classification. The only sign of
the Court's anxiety about the reception of its decision was its emphatic
observation that the decision announcing strict scrutiny of race-based
state action expressed no opinion on the constitutionality of laws pro-
hibiting interracial marriage. 12
2
Three years later, in Loving v. Virginia,123 the Court finally reached
the question it had been avoiding since deciding Brown over a decade
earlier. Applying the strict scrutiny test it had inaugurated in Mc-
Laughlin, the Court struck down Virginia's law prohibiting interracial
marriage, relying heavily on the presumption against racial classifica-
tion to reach its conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional. 124
121 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
122 See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 195-96.
123 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
124 The Court in Loving stated:
There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon
distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct
if engaged in by members of different races. Over the years, this Court has consistently
repudiated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry" as being
"odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8i, 100 (i943). At the very least, the Equal Pro-
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Like McLaughlin, the Loving opinion refrained from discussing how
prohibitions on interracial relationships injured people or shaped their
identities. Yet Loving spoke more directly about the relationship
between classification and caste than would any of the Court's ensuing
cases. The Court declared the prohibition on interracial marriage
unconstitutional not only because the racial classifications violated
strict scrutiny, but because they enforced a system of racial hierarchy:
"There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.
The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy.
'125
In revising its doctrinal framework to focus on questions of racial
classifications, the Court had not abandoned the concern with status
harm that animated Brown. But it had begun to speak about it in a
different language. The Court's judgment about the social meaning of
the antimiscegenation statute - the claim that it enforced "White Su-
premacy" - emerged from an account of the statute's underinclusive-
ness when judged from the standpoint of means-ends rationality. The
presumption against racial classification and the demand for legislative
rationality supplied a framework that enabled the Court to address
status harm that would not be subject to the same forms of critique as
Brown. As one contemporary observed: "[U]nlike Brown, the Loving
opinion made no use of available social science evidence."'1 26 What-
ever role the decade of assault on Footnote Eleven played in the
Court's decision to ground equal protection in a presumption against
racial classification and a demand for instrumental rationality in legis-
lative drafting, the Court's 196os decisions no longer anchored them-
tection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes,
be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(944), and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the ac-
complishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimina-
tion which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two
members of this Court have already stated that they "cannot conceive of a valid legisla-
tive purpose ... which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct
is a criminal offense." McLaughlin v. Virginia, [379 U.S.] at 198 (Stewart, J., joined by
Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at i i (first alteration and omission in original) (citation omitted).
125 Id. There is another reference to white supremacy in the opinion. See id. at 7 ("In Naim,
the state court concluded that the State's legitimate purposes were 'to preserve the racial integrity
of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the
obliteration of racial pride,' obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy."
(quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955))).
126 Norman Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by
Race, 67 MiCH. L. REV. 1553, 1595 (1969).
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selves in an account of social relations and understandings, as Brown
had.
B. The De Facto Segregation Debates:
Constructing an Anticlassification Principle
By the mid-I96os, the Court had begun to express the core value of
equal protection as a presumption that race-based classification was
irrational, but it had yet to work out the implications of this view for a
variety of questions that would haunt equal protection jurisprudence
in the coming decade. In this period, debate about Brown's reasoning
was no longer restricted to questions concerning its legitimacy and
grounds: what harms could the Court legitimately have considered in
deciding Brown? Questions put to Brown's reasoning now concerned
its reach: for what harms had the Court given relief when it decided
Brown? Such questions haunted Southern debates over remedy,127 and
continued as efforts to enforce Brown moved north, where segregation
of the public schools was not conducted by means of explicitly race-
based assignment policies, and so was dubbed "de facto" rather than
"de jure.' 125
What did Brown require in such circumstances? If a school district
did not employ explicitly race-based assignment policies, but its
schools were nonetheless plainly racially identifiable, might school
boards still be constitutionally responsible for such segregation? And
after Brown, did the Constitution permit government to take race-
conscious measures to alleviate racial imbalance for which it was not
constitutionally responsible? It was in these debates that the constitu-
tional injunction against classification on the basis of race would begin
to take on new meanings.
Of course, such debates were not conducted in the abstract, as
questions about the doctrinal entailments of an anticlassification prin-
ciple. Rather, debate over the constitutional questions posed by de
facto segregation in the North was conducted as a debate about the
constitutionality of school segregation that continually referred to prac-
tices of racial classification. As the injunction against racial classifica-
127 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 194, 200
(975) ("[W]henever the Supreme Court has affirmed busing decrees it has spoken of segregation
as a vestige of past racial assignment."); Owen Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of
the Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 19-26 (1974) [hereinafter Fiss, School Desegregation] (arguing
that this language should not be taken at face value).
128 In discussions of the period, the term "de facto segregation" is sometimes used to refer to all
forms of segregation or racial imbalance that were not the result of an explicitly race-based
assignment policy, with the term "de jure segregation" referring to segregation that was the result
of such a policy. Sometimes, however, the de jure-de facto distinction is used to express a legal
conclusion about the state's legal accountability for segregated schools. I am employing the first
usage.
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tion was made to speak to these new questions, it acquired new mean-
ings. As we examine the debates, it becomes clear that the Court's
adoption of the presumption against racial classification did not solve
the questions posed by de facto discrimination; instead, debate over
such questions would come to shape the meaning of the injunction
against classification itself.
i. School Segregation in the North: Government Liability for "De
Facto" Discrimination. - In the early I96os, it was by no means clear
how the Court would answer the question of constitutional liability for
school segregation in the North. There were multiple and conflicting
ways in which one could frame the problem. For example, one could
ask a series of questions about Brown. Brown concerned the constitu-
tional liability of districts that employed explicitly race-based assign-
ment policies; how, if at all, did the opinion speak to the question of
Northern, de facto segregation? Did Brown address the harms of ra-
cial separation as such, or was it exclusively preoccupied with the
stigmatic and demeaning messages communicated by practices of overt
racial assignment? Even if one held the view that the Brown opinion
itself did not address the harms of racial separation as such, one would
still have to decide whether separation as such was a harm, and
whether it was one of constitutional magnitude. Did Brown or some
other constitutional source supply a framework for adducing the an-
swer to these questions? To determine the constitutionality of assign-
ment policies that separated children by race without using overtly
race-based criteria, one might consider Brown's rationale and ask the
question Brown posed: did such practices harm black schoolchildren?
Or one might conclude that Brown was concerned with the only kinds
of harms that ought to be of equal protection consequence: the distinc-
tive harms inflicted by openly communicated, intentional group-based
differentiation itself. Or one might resist this whole line of inquiry and
ask whether, in the absence of an overt race-based assignment policy,
school segregation ought to be causally attributed to the actions of the
state at all. Perhaps it was better accounted for as the expression of a
citizen's choice of residence - a conclusion that then required inquiry
into the state's role in shaping residential segregation, and debate
about the state's constitutional obligations to respond to it.
Commentators and courts divided along multiple lines in address-
ing such questions. All seemed to think that Brown or the Equal Pro-
tection Clause spoke, in some way, to the question of Northern schools,
but they modeled the problem quite differently. As we will see, in
such debates commentators might take the view that what mattered
under the Constitution was explicitly race-based assignment policies,
or classification only, but they might hold such a view because they did
not understand schools that were segregated without such policies to
inflict any harm. That conclusion might be a judgment of social fact
(testable by reference to either social science literature on learning, or
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common understandings about the social meaning of separation itself),
or it might be a judgment about the kinds of injuries that Brown ad-
dressed or should have addressed.
The constitutional presumption against racial classification an-
nounced in McLaughlin and Loving simply did not have the power to
answer such questions. Should the presumption that racial classifica-
tion was unconstitutional also function as a liability-limiting principle?
On what grounds? If racial classification was constitutionally prohib-
ited because it harmed blacks, a case could be made that the Constitu-
tion prohibited other regulatory practices that were not racially moti-
vated but that also harmed blacks. And, as the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights observed in 1963, "[i]f [racial] imbalance is
found to fall within the principles declared in the School Segregation
Cases, then the courts will have to decide what concentration of minor-
ity pupils within a school is illegal." 12 9
In the i96os, there were certainly courts and commentators that
adopted expansive readings of Brown and elaborated theories of liabil-
ity to constrain Northern school districts.130 But more interesting for
129 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS '63, at 55 (1963).
130 Two often-cited articles advocating more expansive theories of liability are Fiss, supra note
io5, at 583-86, 588, 598, and Robert Allen Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West: Le-
gal Aspects, 7 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 228, 232-33, 247 (1963).
An early case that seemed to signal the possibility of expansive liability for segregation in
Northern school districts lacking explicit racial assignment policies was Taylor v. Board of Educa-
tion, 191 F. Supp. i8i (S.D.N.Y. 1961), which warned that "compliance with the Supreme Court's
edict was not to be less forthright in the North than in the South." Id. at 187. One commentator
characterized the decision, which concerned the school system of New Rochelle, New York, as
resting on the view that "[b]oards of education may not ... put the sole responsibility for segre-
gated schools on residential patterns if they reinforce such patterns by their own actions or 'cul-
pable inaction."' Will Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 VILL. L. REV. 353, 359
(i96i). By the mid-ig6os, several courts had held that, under certain circumstances, there was a
constitutional duty to alleviate racial imbalance even when it was not a product of racially moti-
vated state action. See Barksdale v. Springfield Sch. Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543, 546-47 (D. Mass.
1965), vacated and remanded with direction to dismiss without prejudice, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (1st
Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Bd. of
Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); see also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497,
506-o8 (D.D.C. 1967) (discussing de facto segregation and the particular need for heightened judi-
cial scrutiny of legislative and administrative judgments that burden racial minorities and the
poor). See generally Harold W. Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal - The Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1154 (1966) (asking
whether school board liability for de facto segregation is limited to circumstances where imbal-
ance or inequality is the product of discriminatory purpose and concluding that it is not); id. ("In-
deed, as some cases have held, such school assignment policies may quite soundly be held to be
unconstitutional in some circumstances and constitutional in others, depending, among other fac-
tors, on whether the school board has reasonably available alternative courses of action which
would prevent the harm to the Negro children.").
In his Jefferson County opinion, Judge Wisdom approvingly related these decisions to
Brown:
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present purposes are those who took positions in the debate over
Brown's meaning that transformed the injunction against racial classi-
fication into a principle that would limit government's liability for de
facto segregation, by emphasizing that racial classification was the
paradigmatic kind of harm with which equal protection doctrine was,
or should be, concerned.
While it is impossible to canvass the vast body of cases decided and
law review articles written during the i96os that addressed govern-
ment liability for de facto segregation, it is worth examining one early
example, to appreciate how changing the questions posed of Brown
could give the injunction against classification new, yet unstable,
meanings. I examine an article written by John Kaplan in 1964,131
partly because of its influence in the debates of the 196os and partly
because it astutely anticipated the framework the Court would adopt
to manage such questions a decade later.132 In Kaplan's article, we
can see how concerns about harm to blacks shaped conversations
about classification in a period when group-based harm and classifica-
tion were not understood as distinct spheres of concern, as they would
come to be in the formulation of discriminatory purpose doctrine in
the 1970s.
2. "Separation by Classification": The Role of Classification Dis-
course in Restricting Government Liability. - By the early I96Os,
NAACP plaintiffs had filed numerous suits challenging neighborhood
assignment policies as violating equal protection because they deprived
black schoolchildren of a right to attend integrated or "balanced"
schools. 133 Debate turned to the question whether Brown conferred
such a right. John Kaplan challenged the theory of such suits in an in-
" ... The holding in Brown, unexplained by its underlying reasoning, requires no more
than the decision in Bell [v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), that there is
no duty to alleviate imbalance in the absence of racially motivated state action,] but
when illuminated by the reasoning, it permits the result in Barksdale and may require
that result." At the very least, as the Barksdale court saw it, there is a duty to integrate
in the sense that integration is an educational goal to be given a high, high priority
among the various considerations involved in the proper administration of a system be-
set with de facto segregated schools.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 875 (5th Cir. 1966) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting George W. Gillmor & Alan L. Gosule, Duty To Integrate Public Schools? Some Judi-
cial Responses and a Statute, 46 B.U. L. REV. 45, 57 (1966)), aff'd per curiam on rehearing en
banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
131 John Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools - Part II: The General Northern
Problem, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 157 (1964).
132 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 0973).
133 See, e.g., Bell, 253 F. Supp. at 82o. For excerpts from the complaint in this case, see Kaplan,
supra note 131, at 158. At the time of the Bell decision in 1963, there were more than twenty-five
cases pending that challenged school segregation in districts with no officially articulated policy of
segregation, on the ground that any segregation causally attributable to school board action was
unconstitutional. Id. at 157-58.
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fluential article that applied Pollak's proposal that equal protection
doctrine should be structured on a presumption against classifica-
tion1 3 4 to this new constitutional question, the question of Brown's
reach in the North. While Pollak proposed basing Brown on a doc-
trinal presumption against racial classification to defend Brown
against the claim that the decision rested on faulty, biased, or bogus
"sociological" evidence, 135 Kaplan now turned this understanding of
Brown to new ends.1 36 Examining Kaplan's argument illustrates how
the debate over de facto segregation further consolidated and helped
shape understandings of Brown as enjoining racial classification.
When Kaplan emphasized that Brown prohibited classification on
the basis of race, he was not seeking, as Pollak was, to shield the deci-
sion's judgment that segregation harmed blacks from challenge by
Southern whites; rather, he was attempting to specify the kind of harm
for which Brown gave relief, and thus to limit the decision's reach in
the North. With these concerns in view, Kaplan reasoned about Brown
quite differently from Pollak, Black, and other academic defenders of
the late 1950s. Brown, Kaplan argued, did not rest on the finding of
"psychological and sociological fact that separate schools were harmful
to Negro children and were therefore unconstitutional. 1 37 Instead,
Kaplan contended, the harm for which Brown gave relief was "separa-
tion by classification." If "Plessy held that racial classifications did not
offend the Constitution so long as they did not cause some type of
harm," Kaplan argued, "Brown found the necessary harm inherent in
the separation by racial classification in education, and subsequent
cases have dispensed with the necessity for showing any harm at all so
long as racial classifications are drawn by state authority."', 38 A school
district segregated without such formal classifications would not inflict
the same harm, because in Brown "it was the differential treatment ac-
corded to Negroes as Negroes, not the inequality of facilities, that vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment.' 39 Kaplan, in other words, argued
that Brown concerned only the stigmatic injuries inflicted through
practices of racial assignment, and was not otherwise concerned with
harms government might inflict by unequal distribution.
Kaplan thereupon set about contesting the claim that African-
American plaintiffs advanced in numerous pending challenges to seg-
regation in Northern schools, that "when schools are geographically
districted on the basis of residence a Negro child in an all-Negro
134 See Kaplan, supra note 131, at 168 (discussing Pollak).
135 See supra pp. 1492-93.
136 See Kaplan, supra note 31, at 176.
137 Id. at 171.
138 Id. at 173.
139 Id. at 171.
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school suffers the same harm as when districting is frankly on the ba-
sis of race." 140  Moving back and forth between sociological and legal
analysis of the claim, Kaplan contended that Brown and the per cu-
riam decisions did not provide relief for this kind of harm, and that
even if sociological evidence might be marshaled to support a claim for
constitutional relief, the claim still ought not to receive constitutional
sanction.
14 1
Kaplan's claim that Brown concerned the harm of classification
converged with Judge Wisdom's claim that Brown concerned the harm
of classification (in Jefferson County, Judge Wisdom in fact cited Kap-
lan's article 142), yet Kaplan's claim was very different in sociopolitical
salience. In debates over Northern de facto segregation, the claim that
Brown was about racial classification worked to deny constitutional
recognition to claims of injury advanced by plaintiffs challenging seg-
regation, when such segregation was produced by assignment policies
based on "residence" or other formally neutral criteria. This restrictive
reading of Brown was by no means self-evident, and Kaplan worked
to justify his claim that Brown was only concerned with a particular
kind of harm, the harm that flowed from "separation by racial classifi-
cation." Kaplan contended that equal protection liability should be re-
stricted to harms that flowed from separation by classification and
from assignment policies tacitly designed with the purpose of separat-
ing students by race. 143 Brown prohibited only these forms of state ac-
tion, Kaplan argued, because only they would "'cause feelings of infe-
riority' in Negro children."'1 44 In short, Kaplan derived government's
140 Id. at 174.
141 See id. at 174-88.
142 See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 871 nn.75-76, 875 n.85,
876 n.87, 88o n.94 (5th Cir. 1966). For Judge Wisdom's position on the question of Northern dis-
tricts' liability for racial imbalance that was not the product of racially motivated assignment
policies, see supra note 130.
143 See Kaplan, supra note 131, at 173.
144 Id. at 175. Kaplan argued:
Nor can one build any argument on the assertion that confinement to overwhelm-
ingly Negro schools may "cause feelings of inferiority" in Negro children. Certainly
where the state, concededly for no purpose having to do with race, adopts a districting
which results in primarily Negro schools in some circumstances and not in others, it is
hard to say that it has attached a "badge of inferiority" to the Negro students. It is ad-
mittedly possible that a Negro student in a de facto segregated school may not realize
that other Negro children differing only in place of residence can attend integrated
schools and that the school authorities have determined his school on a basis other than
race. On the other hand, it is at least possible that he will appreciate this and be spared
psychological harm. It is true that in a situation where the Negro believes that racial
zoning was used by the school authorities but is unable to prove it, one would expect
that some harm might occur - the same type of harm that may occur to anyone who
incorrectly believes that his rights have been violated. Since the law in this eventuality
would regard the suspicion as an unfounded one, it is difficult to find a rationale under
which the courts might grant relief.
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liability for covert, purposeful discrimination from a particular vision
of the kind of state-inflicted harm that equal protection doctrine
should police: the kind of dignitary affront sustained at the hands of a
speaker intending to communicate disrespect.
Kaplan's reading of Brown solved the de facto discrimination prob-
lem along lines that prefigured the Supreme Court's analysis in the
,970s, in cases like Keyes v. School District No. 1 14 5 and Washington
v. Davis.146 Yet this early formulation of the classification/purpose
framework was more concerned with justifying restrictions on the
kinds of harm that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited than the
Supreme Court's cases of the 1970s would be.147 Kaplan's argument is
instructive, not only as it shows an early effort to justify limits on the
kinds of injury for which Brown would provide redress, but as it illu-
minates the values served by imposing such restrictions on Brown's
meaning.
As Kaplan approached the de facto discrimination problem in the
early I96Os, he structured his analysis around what we might call a
federalism question, asking what kinds of desegregation regimes fed-
eral courts could impose on local government. In this framework, the
distinction between self-imposed and judicially coerced desegregation
mandates was crucial, and provided the normative and analytical filter
for sorting between the harms of segregation that courts may redress
and those that state and local government may redress.
Thus, in the early I96os, Kaplan deployed classification and pur-
pose to restrict the circumstances in which federal courts could impose
liability for de facto segregation on local government; he did not un-
derstand these doctrinal concepts to impose constraints on the efforts
of local government to desegregate voluntarily. Kaplan was frank in
acknowledging that de facto segregation flowing from facially neutral
school assignment policies might inflict harms that would not give rise
to constitutional liability; after reviewing the social science evidence on
the educational benefits of integration, Kaplan argued that local au-
thorities should have constitutional authority to pursue racial bal-
Id. Kaplan's argument is fascinating because it makes the case for a purpose standard of liability
without wholly adopting the "perpetrator" vantage point that, by the 1970s, would come to char-
acterize defenses of the discriminatory purpose standard. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-53 (978) ("The concept of 'racial discrimination' may be
approached from the perspective of either its victim or its perpetrator.... The perpetrator
perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions, but as actions, or series of actions,
inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator.").
145 413 U.S. 189 (973).
146 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
147 See supra note 144; infra section HIA, pp. 1534-44.
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ance. 148 For this reason, even as Kaplan emphasized that Brown con-
cerned the wrong of racial classification, his proposed doctrinal
framework allowed state and local governments to use race-conscious
measures to rectify de facto segregation. It authorized state and local
governments to redress racial imbalance without restricting such poli-
cies to cases where there was a prior breach of the anticlassification
principle (the technique the Court used to justify Southern remedial
decrees that sought the elimination of racially identifiable schools,
149
and would later use to limit forms of constitutionally permissible re-
medial affirmative action'S°); rather, this grant of authority rested on
the understanding that facially neutral school assignment policies in-
flicted other kinds of harms on blacks that legislatures, but not courts,
might redress.
In this, Kaplan elaborated the view that would prevail throughout
the i96os: a state or local government might adopt race-conscious dis-
tricting plans to alleviate de facto segregation, when courts had not
construed the Constitution to require them.ls In Kaplan's argument,
the claim that Brown was centrally concerned with the wrong of
"separation by racial classification" functioned as a limit on federal
courts, leaving Northern school districts with control over the pace
and form of desegregation.
At the same time, Kaplan's translation of Brown into a classifica-
tion/purpose framework remained firmly rooted in a conception of dis-
crimination as status harm to blacks. He understood race-conscious
state action undertaken to promote integration as constitutionally
permitted, even if such policies precipitated white claims of harm:
148 See Kaplan, supra note 131, at 205.
149 See, e.g., Swann v,.Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i, 15-16 (1971) (asserting
that "[t]he objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation," and holding that when school authorities default on "their obligation to
proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure
a unitary school system"); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (968) (holding that
school boards "operating state-compelled dual systems" at the time of Brown II were "clearly
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a uni-
tary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"); see also Owen
M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case - Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 700 (971) (discussing the remedial rationale on which the Court prem-
ised the school board's responsibility for creating a unitary integrated school system).
150 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 5o8-o9 (1989) (invalidating a Rich-
mond City Council plan that reserved thirty percent of the dollar amount of each city construc-
tion contract for "Minority Business Enterprises" on the ground that it was not narrowly tailored
to remedy the effects of documented prior discrimination by the city or by those with whom it
was doing business).
151 See Kaplan, supra note 131, at 182 ("Granting that consideration of integration might be a
good rule for school boards to follow, it is questionable whether the courts could or should enforce
it under the Constitution."). For a discussion of case law elaborating this understanding, see infra
pp. 1517-i8.
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"[T]he fact that zoning to accomplish racial integration might require
some children, Negro or white, to travel an unreasonably long distance
to school might not be enough to render such efforts unconstitutional
considering the good that may be expected to flow from integra-
tion." 5 2 Kaplan presciently concluded his article with the suggestion
that a choice would have to be made among different kinds of race-
conscious state action that promoted integration, to determine which
kinds of impositions on whites were constitutionally permissible and
which were not - a judgment about which "a great deal more factual
evidence, as well as thought, will be brought to bear.., before a final
resolution is reached."'
15 3
Thus, in 1964, when Kaplan argued that Brown should be under-
stood as prohibiting "separation by racial classification," his chief con-
cern was limiting the authority of federal courts to direct the desegre-
gation initiatives of Northern school systems. Protecting values of
local control left Northern communities with discretion in the ways
they would implement Brown. It was through such a doctrinal
framework that the welfare of white communities would achieve con-
stitutional protection.' 5 4 Kaplan anticipated, but did not significantly
rely upon, the concept of classification itself as a means by which
white plaintiffs might prevail upon federal courts to give constitutional
protection to their welfare claims, and thus to limit the discretion of
local government to pursue desegregative aims.
C. The Colorblindness Debates:
Constructing an Anticlassification Principle
Throughout the i96os, courts and commentators continued to wres-
tle with questions of government liability for segregation in the North;
there was early agreement that the Constitution prohibited segregation
that was the product of a covert discriminatory purpose, but continu-
ing disagreement about when, if ever, school districts might otherwise
be held liable for segregation occurring under formally race-neutral as-
signment policies. 
15 5
152 Kaplan, supra note 131, at 206.
153 Id. Kaplan observed:
Perhaps a line may be drawn permitting consideration of race in matters such as site se-
lection, zoning, and determination of sending and receiving schools where children are
to be bussed. It might be that these remedies for de facto segregation would be permis-
sible even though some students might suffer diminished rights thereby.
Id.
154 Cf Vieira, supra note 126, at 1618 ("There is reason to doubt that the political processes
could operate at the present time to impose a school program which a substantial majority of the
community believed would disadvantage their children.").
155 In 1967, one commentator summarized the law as follows:
Although it is still not settled whether the equal protection clause requires the alleviation
of racial imbalance when racially motivated state action has not been shown, it is now
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But if there was disagreement about the circumstances in which
state and local governments might be liable under the Fourteenth
Amendment for segregation in public school systems, there was early
and widespread agreement that state and local governments had the
authority to remedy racial imbalance in public schools. 156 In this re-
spect, as in others, Kaplan grasped a central cleavage in the law: fed-
eral courts would allow state and local governments to rectify racial
imbalance in circumstances where the federal courts would not them-
selves intervene to compel redress.
Thus, during the very period when the Supreme Court was adopt-
ing the strict scrutiny framework set forth in McLaughlin and Loving,
federal courts were routinely upholding the right of state and local
governments to implement race-conscious policies intended to lessen
de facto public school segregation. Courts, in other words, understood
equal protection as a race-asymmetric constraint on governmental
action; they understood that the purpose of equal protection doctrine
was to prevent the state from inflicting certain forms of status harm on
minorities.
But this understanding of the presumption against racial classifica-
tion began to shift by the end of the I96OS, in response to escalating
national conflicts over race and the rise of a new generation of deseg-
regation initiatives aimed at post-secondary and professional educa-
tion. Constitutional challenges to voluntary desegregation initiatives,
which appeared as soon as those initiatives began, suddenly had legal
traction. Until the I97os, race-conscious assignment policies were ei-
ther understood as licit forms of racial classification, or not counted as
"invidious classifications" at all. Amidst a national conversation about
what harms and whose harms the Equal Protection Clause would re-
dress, judges began to analyze university admissions practices as racial
clear that when racial imbalance is produced by racially motivated state action, there
has been a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Peter F. Rousselot, Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes in the Public Schools of
the North and West: The Emerging Role for Private Constitutional Litigation, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 698, 708 (1967); see also sources cited supra note 130.
The Court did not address the question of liability for de facto segregation until its decision
in Keyes v. School District No. r, 413 U.S. 189 (I973), a decision that straddled the debate by
means of a deft deployment of presumptions. In Keyes, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
held that to establish school district liability for de facto segregation, plaintiffs would have to
show that the government had acted with an intent to segregate. But if plaintiffs demonstrated
"intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system," that
showing would give rise to "a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is
not adventitious," and the burden would shift to the school system to prove that segregation in the
rest of the system was "not also the result of intentionally segregative actions." Id. at 207. When
the Court decided Keyes in 1973, Justice Powell criticized Justice Brennan's embrace of a dis-
criminatory purpose framework for distinguishing between de jure and de facto racial segrega-
tion. See id. at 224-32 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156 See infra pp. 1517-18.
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classifications subject to the presumption of unconstitutionality. This
conflict over the meaning of the equal protection guarantee recapitu-
lated in eerie ways the "harm" and "neutral principles" debates of the
1950S.
i. De Facto Segregation and Color Consciousness: Constitutional
Permission To Rectify Racial Imbalance in the '96os. - The strict
scrutiny framework adopted in McLaughlin and Loving created
a strong presumption of unconstitutionality for all government action
that classified on the basis of race. But there were many race-
conscious practices that courts confidently upheld under the strict
scrutiny framework. In 1969, one commentator surveyed govern-
mental practices employing racial classifications - including practices
today not typically understood as using such classifications - and
noted that the Court had upheld the use of racial classifications in
the nation's antidiscrimination laws, 5 7 in many governmental prac-
tices that invited or required the designation of race for purposes of
data collection or recordkeeping,15 8  in the nation's immigration
157 See Vieira, supra note 126, at 1596 ("Federal and state anti-discrimination laws, which bear
tangentially on the question of permissible classification by race, have consistently been upheld by
the Supreme Court." (citing Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (I945))). For a recent ar-
gument that antidiscrimination legislation - in particular, disparate impact law - may be a
practice of racial classification that contravenes tenets of modern strict scrutiny doctrine, see
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, Ii7 HARV. L. REV.
493 (2oo3).
158 See Vieira, supra note 126, at 1598-6oi. Not surprisingly, the legal status of data collection
practices has depended on the uses to which the data was put. See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (finding an impermissible "opportunity for discrimination" in the state's selec-
tion of jurors from a racially segregated tax digest); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964)
(barring compulsory designation of race on a ballot on the ground that it was "placing ... the
power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls"). In
Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. i9 (1964) (per curiam), the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court deci-
sion invalidating laws that separated voting and property records based on race but upheld a law
requiring that divorce decrees designate the race of the divorcees. See id. at i9 (affirming Hamm
v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 230 F. Supp. i56 (E.D. Va. 1964)). According to the lower
court, the former statutes "serve[d] no other purpose than to classify and distinguish official re-
cords on the basis of race or color," while the latter served the legitimate purpose of collecting "vi-
tal statistics." Hamm, 23o F. Supp. at 158.
Some early fair-employment laws prohibited racial recordkeeping. See Owen M. Fiss, A
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 265 (I97I) ("At one point in the history
of fair employment laws the requirement of color blindness was taken in its most expansive sense.
It was viewed as including a ban on racial record-keeping. The antidiscrimination prohibition
was thought to preclude any form of record-keeping that identified the race of employees or ap-
plicants for employment. This ban is probably at an end."). By the late i96os, racial recordkeep-
ing by employers was not only permitted, it was required by antidiscrimination law. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IV, § 402, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 247 (1964) (requiring a bian-
nual survey to determine educational opportunity by race); Fiss, supra, at 265 & n.32 (citing regu-
lations).
The civil rights movement's stance on racial designations and data collection seems to have
shifted with the uses to which such information was put. A speaker for the NAACP at a 1962
meeting of the American Statistical Association stated, for example, that "[tihe NAACP oppose[d]
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laws, 159 and in some aspects of the criminal justice system., 60  But the
focal point of analysis was the government's efforts to rectify racial
imbalance in the nation's public schools. Voluntary efforts to remedy
racial imbalance, he observed, were commonly upheld by courts under
the strict scrutiny framework, on inadequately theorized grounds.'
6'
In other words, during the I96os, courts did not understand the
presumption of unconstitutionality to constrain race-conscious state ac-
tion voluntarily undertaken for the purpose of integrating de facto seg-
regated public schools. Throughout the i96os, courts repeatedly held
that that state and local governments could use race-specific measures
to break down de facto segregation or "racial imbalance" in the na-
tion's public schools, even when there was no finding of a constitu-
the compilation and publication of racially classified data on crime and illegitimate births because
such information sheds no significant light on the causes, ... because it is subject to distortion
and misrepresentation, and because it is utilized to thwart the drive toward an egalitarian, plural-
istic society." Henry Lee Moon, Selective Racial Statistics, in AM. STATISTICAL ASS'N,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIAL STATISTICS SECTION 252, 253 (1962), quoted in Albert
Mindlin, The Designation of Race or Color on Forms, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 110, 115-16 (1966).
The speaker clarified, however, that the NAACP supported government collection of "[a] host of
facts revealing the relative socio-economic status of the Negro." Id. The NAACP's caution was
no doubt due to the ways in which Southerners were using such data to construct new rationaliza-
tions for racial exclusion that would survive in the post-Brown world. See Loren Miller, Race,
Poverty, and the Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 386, 399-400 (1966) (arguing that "administrative racial
classification of welfare recipients has [aroused] legislative hopes that a permissible social classifi-
cation can be found to reach the constitutionally impermissible end of racial discrimination" and
that "[t]here is ... no more legal warrant for the keeping and dissemination of these statistics, as
such, than there is for compilation and distribution of religious data on recipients of old age assis-
tance"). See generally Walker, supra note 41.
But as racial designation and data collection became an integral part of the enforcement of
civil rights legislation, the movement's stance on the practice changed accordingly. See Daniel A.
Searing, Discrimination in Home Finance, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1113, 114o n.i56 (I973) (re-
porting one lawyer's statement in an FDIC hearing on the use of racial data collection to enforce
federal lending laws that, despite previous opposition to racial data collection, civil rights groups
"are now almost unanimous in the conclusion that racial record-keeping is an essential element of
an effective civil rights enforcement program" (quoting William Taylor) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); William L. Taylor, Federal Civil Rights Laws: Can They Be Made To Work?, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 971, 997-98 (970) (observing that "old concerns about 'color-blindness' have ren-
dered some groups immobile on [the data-collection] issue" and maintaining that "[an effort by
civil rights groups to resolve their differences and encourage the collection and use of such racial
data with appropriate safeguards to protect the individual would be an important first step in
persuading federal agencies to establish more realistic and workable systems of enforcement").
159 See Vieira, supra note i26, at I571-77.
160 See id. at 1588-91 (discussing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)). For some recent ac-
counts analyzing the role of race in the criminal justice system, see R. Richard Banks, Race-Based
Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1075 (2OOI); and Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, i J. GENDER
RACE& JUST. 1(997).
161 See Vieira, supra note 126, at 1554 ("Voluntary remedies classifying by race have frequently
been upheld by state and lower federal courts. However, the cases have been conspicuously un-
successful in developing rules of law which would not only sustain the action before the court, but
adequately differentiate it from invidious uses of racial criteria.").
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tional violation. 162  In 1971, Chief Justice Burger confirmed this un-
derstanding in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
163
when he observed:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to for-
mulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for ex-
ample, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational
policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; ab-
162 During the ig6os, courts routinely upheld the right of state and local governments to act in
a race-conscious fashion to ameliorate de facto segregation in public school assignments. See, e.g.,
Tometz v. Bd. of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498, 501 (I1. 1968) (upholding the Armstrong Act, which di-
rected Illinois school boards to take steps to undo de facto segregation, and observing that all
state and federal courts to have considered the use of race for these purposes had found such use
constitutional); id. ("State laws or administrative policies, directed toward the reduction and even-
tual elimination of defacto segregation of children in the schools and racial imbalance, have been
approved by every high State court which has considered the issue .... Similarly, the Federal
courts which have considered the issue ... have recognized that voluntary programs of local
school authorities designed to alleviate de facto segregation and racial imbalance in the schools
are not constitutionally forbidden."); Olson v. Bd. of Educ., 250 F. Supp. iooo, ioo6 (E.D.N.Y.)
(finding that Brown did not preclude the state from taking race-conscious action to integrate
schools, and that such action did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of white parents
whose children would be affected), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 367 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966);
id. ("We begin with the postulates that there is no constitutional mandate to mix the races in order
to remedy racial imbalance for educational purposes, nor any such mandate precluding such mix-
ing or in effect requiring school authorities to maintain neighborhood schools." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F. Supp. 129, I3I (W.D.N.Y. 196S) (holding that the state edu-
cation commissioner's order directing the elimination of de facto segregation and the local plan
adopted pursuant to this order did not violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff parents),
affid, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); id. ("The tenor of these and related decisions, in the court's view,
clearly indicates that the Fourteenth Amendment, while prohibiting any form of invidious dis-
crimination, does not bar cognizance of race in a proper effort to eliminate racial imbalance in a
school system." (footnote omitted)); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25, 33-34 (D.N.J. 1964) (holding
that a city's plan to redraw attendance lines for elementary schools so as to counter de facto seg-
regation did not violate the constitutional rights of white parents), vacated in part and remanded
on other grounds, 351 F.2d 323 (3 d Cir. 1965); id. ("This Court is in agreement with the principle
... that a local board of education is not constitutionally prohibited from taking race into account
in drawing or redrawing school attendance lines for the purpose of reducing or eliminating de
facto segregation in its public schools."); Morean v. Bd. of Educ., 200 A.2d 97, ioo (N.J. 1964) (per
curiam) (holding that a school board's race-conscious efforts to minimize racial imbalance in its
schools did not deny white parents' right to equal protection); id. ("Constitutional color blindness
may be wholly apt when the frame of reference is an attack on official efforts toward segregation;
it is not generally apt when the attack is on official efforts toward the avoidance of segregation.");
Balaban v. Rubin, i99 N.E.2d 375, 377 (N.Y. 1964) (upholding the New York City Board of Edu-
cation's establishment of the school zone for a new junior high school in such a way as to promote
racial balance in the school); id. ("There can be no doubt (since Brown v. Board of Educ.) that de
jure segregation is unconstitutional. The question, however, as to whether there is an affirmative
constitutional obligation to take action to reduce de facto segregation is simply not in this case.
The issue, we repeat, is: May (not must) the schools correct racial imbalance? The simple fact as
to the plan adopted and here under attack is that it excludes no one from any school and has no
tendency to foster or produce racial segregation." (citation omitted)).
163 402 U.S. I (i971).
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sent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be
within the authority of a federal court.
16 4
Chief Justice Burger made this assertion without providing sup-
porting or qualifying authority; he was simply summarizing the hold-
ings of lower federal courts. 165 Time and again, the judiciary affirmed
that the Constitution permitted state and local governments to employ
race-conscious means to achieve the legitimate and important end of
ameliorating segregation. In the course of allowing race-conscious
policies designed to break down segregation, some courts indicated
that there might be constitutional limits, not yet reached, on state and
local governments' use of race-conscious measures to combat segrega-
tion. 166 But as Chief Justice Burger's remarks illustrate, there was
hardly a pressing sense that the Fourteenth Amendment was a con-
straint on voluntary efforts to desegregate.
In other words, during the first decade after the Court declared in
McLaughlin that the Equal Protection Clause enjoined state action
that classified on the basis of race, judges generally understood the
presumption against racial classification as a race-asymmetric con-
straint: courts wielded the principle to protect blacks against status-
enforcing harm but did not employ it to constrain race-based state ac-
tion designed to alleviate segregation, even when whites objected that
such race-based policies inflicted harm.
167
164 Id. at I6 (emphasis added).
165 See supra note 162; see also Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1177 n.4
(Cal. 1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting) ("Swann's conclusion in this regard is consistent with the nu-
merous court decisions holding that school authorities have the constitutional authority to utilize
racial classification to undo de facto school segregation, even if such de facto segregation is not in
itself unconstitutional."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
School Litigation Strategies for the i97o's: New Phases in the Continuing Quest for Quality
Schools, 1970 WiS. L. REV. 257, 265 n.26 (observing that courts had "generally upheld voluntary
school board action to correct racial imbalance against challenges by white parents").
166 Some of the opinions suggested that there might be limits on the government's constitu-
tional authority to engage in race-conscious measures to ameliorate de facto segregation or racial
imbalance in the schools, though they did not find such limits implicated in the litigated cases.
See, e.g., Fuller, 230 F. Supp. at 34 (contemplating that some forms of race-conscious remedies for
de facto segregation could violate the equal protection rights of white children under the Brown
standard); id. ("Plaintiffs have not shown, nor does this Court believe, that racial integration, per
se, discriminates against white pupils. Only if specific provisions of the Plan do in fact discrimi-
nate against plaintiffs because of their race, could it be said to result in an infringement of their
constitutional rights."); Olson, 250 F. Supp. at ioio & n.43 (subjecting the government's race-
conscious remedies for de facto segregation to McLaughlin's heightened scrutiny standard to es-
tablish whether they constituted violations of the white plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights).
By the end of the decade, commentators had begun to focus on this question. See Vieira, supra
note 126, at 16io-i8 (discussing different methods of correcting racial imbalance).
167 See Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 138o, 1382-83 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978)
(in the course of refusing an application for a stay, rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that they had a
"federal right[] ... to be free from racial quotas and to be free from extensive pupil transportation
that destroys fundamental rights of liberty and privacy" (quoting the plaintiffs' application for a
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White plaintiffs, and academic commentators speaking on their be-
half, certainly did raise such objections. In the 196os, as courts began
to reason about desegregation in terms that focused on the wrongs of
racial classification, plaintiffs objecting to race-conscious measures de-
signed to achieve "racial balance" in public schools expressed their ob-
jections in the language of colorblindness. 168 Shifting the justification
for disestablishing segregation from a discourse of harm to a discourse
of classification did not immunize desegregation policies and decrees
from challenge. 169 Even as Judge Wisdom expressed these concerns as
grounds for embracing the anticlassification rationale enunciated in
McLaughlin, critics of desegregation policies and decrees had already
begun to express their objections in anticlassification discourse. "But
those who really, but covertly, want to maintain the segregated status
quo cry 'The Constitution is color-blind,"' Judge Skelly Wright com-
plained the year before Judge Wisdom wrote. 170
stay)); id. ("While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme Court of California was required by
the United States Constitution to take the action that it has taken in this case, I have very little
doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action.").
168 See Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F. Supp. 129, 130-31 (W.D.N.Y. 1965) (upholding the state
commissioner's desegregation order and the resulting local plan, which involved use of racial con-
siderations, to eliminate de facto segregation in the Buffalo school system), aff'd, 378 F.2d 22 (2d
Cir. 1967).
The tenor of these and related decisions clearly indicates that in the court's view, the Four-
teenth Amendment, while prohibiting invidious discrimination, did not bar cognizance of race as
part of a proper effort to eliminate racial imbalance in a school system. With respect to the so-
called "colorblind" standard advocated by these plaintiffs, the remarks of District Judge Bohanon
in Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 244 F. Supp. 97I (W.D. Okla. 1965),
are equally appropriate. Speaking of the rights of the defendant members of the school board, the
court stated:
Clearly, defendants may consider race in disestablishing their segregated schools
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The admoni-
tion of the first Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in [Plessy] that "Our Consti-
tution is color-blind" was directed against the "separate but equal" doctrine, and its re-
jection in [Brown] was an explicit recognition that separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal, and did not convert Justice Harlan's metaphor into constitutional
dogma barring affirmative action to accomplish the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 981 (citations omitted).
169 In Jefferson County, Judge Wisdom argued that justifying Brown exclusively in the lan-
guage of harm opened the way "for proponents of the status quo to attempt to show, on the facts,
that integration may be harmful or the greater of two evils," and he therefore urged that equal
protection doctrine be restated in the language of "invidious classification." United States v. Jef-
ferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 871 (5th Cir. 1966); see supra p. 1499.
170 J. Skelly Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 16
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 478, 489 (1965). Wright continued:
Securely they wrap themselves in the famous words of Mr. Justice Harlan I, and point to
the language in Brown indicating that classification on the basis of race violates the
equal protection clause.
Like most aphorisms, Mr. Justice Harlan's felicitous phrase cannot be taken liter-
ally.... The Constitution not only recognizes Negroes as such, but makes specific provi-
sion for their protection in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
2004] 1519
HeinOnline -- 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1519 2003-2004
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
The dynamic was simple enough. When courts justified disestab-
lishment of segregation in the language of harm, critics attacked judi-
cial decrees in the language of harm. As judges began to justify dises-
tablishment of segregation in the language of classification, opponents
of desegregation decrees and policies expressed their objections in
terms of the anticlassification principle itself. 7
Even though opponents of race-conscious measures designed to
break down segregation raised colorblindness objections during the
I96Os, courts did not endorse these arguments. 72 As Judge Wisdom
colorfully explained the asymmetry:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid
conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a
benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race. In
that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color
conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the ef-
fects of past discrimination. The criterion is the relevancy of color to a
legitimate governmental purpose.
173
Judge Wisdom observed that government could legitimately use
race in programs designed to redress discrimination in jury service,
voter registration, and education, as well as in census and adoption
proceedings. 1 74 Race-based state action offended the Constitution only
if it harmed minorities or enforced inequality in group status. As an-
Id. (footnote omitted).
Paul Freund examined the colorblindness objection to preferential treatment early in the
ig6os. See Paul A. Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of Law, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 199, 204 (1965)
("Is not the Constitution color blind? Can a preferential treatment of Negroes be squared with
the requirement of equal protection of the laws? Is it not an unconstitutional discrimination in
reverse?"). Like Wright, Freund concluded that race-specific action was permissible, emphasizing
the constitutional history of the Fourteenth Amendment and an antisubordination understanding
of the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 204-05 ("If we look at the Constitution rather than a
constitutional metaphor, and at the history of the fourteenth amendment, we find that the most
obvious fact about it is that it grew out of the Civil War in an effort to raise Negroes from a level
of legal inferiority.").
171 Wechsler anticipated this turn of events. He argued that if courts construed the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit legislatures from classifying on the basis of race, this principle must be
tested not only by its impact on state-sponsored segregation, "but also by its impact upon meas-
ures that take race into account to equalize job opportunity or to reduce defacto segregation, as in
New York City's schools." HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDA-
MENTAL LAW, at xiv (1g61). Bickel strenuously disagreed, calling for more flexibility in applica-
tion of an anticlassification principle, in keeping with his antisubordination reading of Brown.
See BICKEL, supra note 43, at 59-6o ("[I]t may be argued that the exceptions to the principle of
the Segregation Cases which Mr. Wechsler foresees are themselves principled ones .... Benevo-
lent quotas, for example, differ from segregation. They do not completely deny the Negro's free-
dom of association, with the inevitable consequence of keeping him in a situation of permanent
inferiority.").
172 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 162 and 168.
173 Jefferson County, 372 F.2d at 876.
174 See id. at 876-77.
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other judge expressed this understanding: "Constitutional color blind-
ness may be wholly apt when the frame of reference is an attack on of-
ficial efforts toward segregation; it is not generally apt when the attack
is on official efforts toward the avoidance of segregation."1 5
More was required before courts would wield the presumption
against racial classification as a constitutional limit on governmental
efforts to break down segregation. Courts did not begin to articulate
this understanding as constitutional law until desegregation policies
began to take new forms, and hostility to the desegregation initiatives
of the Warren Court found expression in the election of Richard Nixon
in 1968.
2. Harm Redux: The Form and Setting of Desegregation Initiatives
- Harm and Classification in the I97os. - It was during the 1970S
that courts began to reshape the presumption against racial classifica-
tion into a constitutional constraint on voluntary efforts to combat seg-
regation. This change in the meaning and practical salience of the pre-
sumption seems in part attributable to a change in the composition of
the federal judiciary over the 1970s, 1 76 in part attributable to the po-
litical climate in which judges were interpreting the Constitution, and
in part attributable to a change in the kinds of programs subject to
constitutional challenge.
There is no doubt that political struggles over desegregation shaped
the development of antidiscrimination law. In 1968, Richard Nixon
ran for office by campaigning against the Warren Court on issues of
race.1 77 He couched his objections to the race jurisprudence of the day
175 Morean v. Bd. of Educ., 2o A.2d 97, io (N.J. 1964).
176 Howard Gillman reports:
By the end of Johnson's administration over 70% of judges in this enlarged judiciary
were appointed by Democratic presidents - more than 39% by Johnson himself. In
197o a Republican was in the White House and Democrats controlled the House and
Senate by margins of 57% and 56% respectively; that same year, Democrats made up
63% of circuit court judges and 66% of district court judges.
Howard Gillman, Constitutional Law as Partisan Entrenchment: The Political Origins of Lib-
eral Judicial Activism 15 (Sept. 12, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (footnote omitted), available at http://www.yale.edu/law/ltw/papers/ltw-
gillman.doc.
By the time of Nixon's departure from office, 49.5% of sitting federal judges had been ap-
pointed by Republican presidents; when Ford left office, that figure was 54.2%. Id. at 17 n.75
(citing DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 23, 68-7I, 84 (1996)). See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understand-
ing the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, io68 (2001) ("Partisan entrenchment
through presidential appointments to the judiciary is the best account of how the meaning of the
Constitution changes over time through Article III interpretation rather than through Article V
amendment.").
177 For Nixon's charges against the Warren Court, see DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.,
CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
18o (1999):
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in terms that appealed to Northern whites who understood themselves
as committed to racial equality, but concerned about desegregation de-
crees and policies that too radically transformed the institutions of eve-
ryday life. 178  By the mid-I96os, black protest in the North was more
confrontational and sometimes violent - prompting anger in whites,
to which Nixon appealed in a campaign that focused on "busing" and
"law and order."179 Nixon and his audience understood the tacit racial
reference.'8 0 In the words of one commentator, "[t]he trick lay in sym-
pathizing with and appealing to the fears of angry whites without ap-
pearing to become an extremist and driving away moderates," or, as
John Ehrlichman described the process, "present[ing] a position on
crime, education, or public housing in such a way that a voter could
'avoid admitting to himself that he was attracted by a racist ap-
On school integration, Nixon explained in August that he was opposed to busing to
achieve racial balance in schools, and would appoint as judges those "who attempted to
interpret, not make law" and who did not think it proper to act as local school boards.
In an interview for telecast in the Carolinas on September 12, he announced that he op-
posed withholding federal funds from school districts that had not desegregated. "I be-
lieve that [Brown] was a correct decision, but on the other hand, while that decision
... said that we should not have segregation, when you go beyond that and say that it is
the responsibility of the federal government and the federal courts to, in effect, act as lo-
cal school districts ... then I think we are going too far.".. "Our schools are for educa-
tion, not integration," he told reporters two days later.
Id. (alterations (first two omissions in original) (footnote omitted).
178 Nixon built the electoral appeal of the Republican Party by situating its racial politics be-
tween those of his opponents in the 1968 election: George Wallace and Hubert Humphrey. See
LEWIS L. GOULD, 1968: THE ELECTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA 103-05, 139-40; IRWIN
UNGER & DEBI UNGER, TURNING POINT. 1968, at 459 (1988) ("[Nixon] would refuse as presi-
dent, he said, to sanction forced busing of school children for the sake of racial balance. On the
other hand, he would oppose giving federal funds to any school district that practiced blatant seg-
regation. He would discourage a federal fair housing law, but he would not oppose state laws on
the subject.").
179 For an account of the Watts riot and the rise and fall of the black power movement, see
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 115, at 296-32 i. For an account of the changing forms of black activ-
ism in education, see Bell, supra note 165. For the text of Nixon's television ads, see JOE
McGINNIss, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT. 1968, at 240-53. See also STEPHEN C.
SHADEGG, WINNING'S A LOT MORE FUN 250-51 (1969); STEPHENSON, supra note 177, at
18o. Shadegg reports:
The liberal element in the Republican party meanwhile, speaking through the
Ripon Society, a collection of professed intellectuals speaking in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, urged Nixon to drop the phrase "law and order," which they said was a code word
meaning "use the police to suppress the Negroes." Nixon began to use the phrase "law
and justice" which was only a slight modification of his earlier "law and order with jus-
tice." But the Republican candidate for Vice President, Spiro Agnew, refused to make
the concession, and continued to say "law and order," a position he could not have main-
tained without Nixon's approval.
SHADEGG, supra, at 250.
180 See MCGINNISS, supra note 179, at 23 (noting that on viewing the finished campaign
commercial, Nixon exulted to his staff that the commercial "hits it right on the nose ... about law
and order and the damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there"); see also DAN T. CARTER, FROM
GEORGE WALLACE TO NEWT GINGRICH: RACE IN THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION, 1963-1994, at 30 (1996).
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peal."""' Yet even as it appealed to racial resentment to split tradi-
tionally Democratic coalitions, 18 2 the Nixon administration did not
wholly break with the desegregation initiatives of the Johnson admini-
stration. 18 3  Its electoral strategy was sufficiently successful, however,
that by 1972 Nixon was campaigning on opposition to welfare, busing,
quotas, and affirmative action - even against programs begun in his
own administration.18 4  Nixon entrenched a changed understanding of
race and the Constitution in the Supreme Court, appointing four Jus-
tices over the course of his six years in office. In time, Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and Blackmun would all play
a role in the reorientation of equal protection doctrine, though, as
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Swann indicates, the realignment of
politics and jurisprudence was by no means linear or mechanical.
8 5 It
was not simply that the composition of the federal judiciary was
181 CARTER, supra note 18o, at 30 (quoting JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE
NIXON YEARS 223 (1982)). There was a class dynamic at play in white backlash. See
THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDEN'T. 1968, at 68 (1969) (observing that
the burdens of desegregation were disproportionately imposed on "white workingmen, who were
asked also to share their schools, neighborhoods and places of amusement with the blacks" and
that "all through 1968 the working-class base of the Democratic coalition was to be torn almost as
if by civil war, as white workingmen questioned the risk and the pace imposed on them in the
adventure").
182 The racial wedge was so successful in driving traditionally Democratic voters into the Re-
publican Party that party strategists such as Kevin Phillips theorized that it could establish a
foundation for a new Republican majority. See generally KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING
REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (Anchor Books 1970) (1969). On Phillips's strategy, see CARTER, su-
pra note 18o, at 42-44; and UNGER & UNGER, supra note 178, at 8- 9 .
183 See DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON'S CIVIL RIGHTS I (2OO). Kotlowski explains:
The Nixon administration implemented affirmative action and set-aside programs for
minority-owned companies. It desegregated southern schools and reformed Native
American policy. Attorney General John N. Mitchell was not jesting when he advised
African American leaders in 1969 to "watch what we do, rather tha[n] what we say" in
the area of civil rights. ... Leonard Garment, a liberal Nixon aide, correctly asserted
that the president's enforcement of civil rights "was for the most part operationally pro-
gressive but obscured by clouds of retrogressive rhetoric."
Id.
184 CARTER, supra note 180, at 46.
185 The transition was not abrupt; it occurred over the course of the decade. For example, in
1971, Chief Justice Burger authored two key decisions that provided civil rights plaintiffs (and
sympathetic judges) with tools to challenge segregation. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i, 16 (1971) (discussed supra pp. 15 17-18); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (recognizing a disparate impact cause of action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964). 1971 was also the year in which the Court first struck down a law un-
der the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that it discriminated against women. See Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). Over the course of the decade, with the nation's mood and the com-
position of the Court shifting, equal protection law decidedly, and consequentially, changed
course, in myriad doctrinal locations that do not lend themselves to simple summary.
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changing; 8 6 raging conversations about race in the electoral process
had altered the climate in which federal judges were deciding cases.
The practical contexts in which federal courts elucidated the mean-
ing of the constitutional presumption against racial classification
changed in the 197OS as well, in ways that may well have altered judi-
cial intuitions about the presumption's proper application. 187  By the
1970s, courts were beginning to hear challenges to policies employed to
combat segregation in different institutional settings. The Nixon ad-
ministration began to enforce an affirmative action requirement in
federal contracts by executive order,8 8 and challenges to affirmative
action in construction hiring were beginning to reach the federal
courts. At one level, these race-conscious hiring preferences presented
the same question as did voluntary efforts to integrate public schools:
whether government could take race into account in measures de-
signed to break down segregation. In each case, the use of racial crite-
ria in the design of governmental policies redirected valuable resources
from whites to blacks. But to some, the hiring preferences were a
more constitutionally problematic desegregation initiative because they
involved goods that might be understood as limited in quantity and
subject to a meritocratic rule of distribution. Others doubted that such
186 Nixon had more opportunity to transform the Supreme Court than to transform the lower
federal courts. See supra note 176.
187 Courts were often quite direct about such matters. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 162 and
168.
188 For general background on the plan, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, i96o-i972, at 322-45 (990),
which discusses the revival of the Philadelphia Plan; and Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A
Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 723-25 (1972). Because there
was a tension between the executive order and provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that barred preferences, most of the early battles over affirmative action in federal contract-
ing were fought as separation-of-powers problems, in which constraints on preferential hiring
were understood as statutory rather than constitutional. This tension escalated as the Nixon ad-
ministration expanded the program's scope. See GRAHAM, supra, at 341 ("[In 1970,] the Labor
Department issued a new set of rules that would extend the Philadelphia Plan's model of propor-
tional representation by race and selected ethnicity ... in employment to basically all of the ac-
tivities and facilities of all federal contractors - which by Arthur Fletcher's estimate covered
from one-third to one-half of all U.S. workers.").
There is considerable speculation on the Nixon administration's motives for enforcing and
expanding the plan:
[Secretary of Labor George] Shultz's major reason for reviving the Philadelphia
Plan may well have flowed from professional and personal convictions about the social
irresponsibility of the construction-trades unions and the economic irrationality of ra-
cism in the American political economy. But Ehrlichman conceded that Shultz was not
above appreciating, with a twinkle in his Republican eye, the partisan virtues as well as
the moral splendor of linking the Democratic-voting black laborers and the lily-white
construction craft unions in intimate dialogue by "tying their tails together."
Id. at 325.
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distinctions were relevant to the constitutional question. 18 9 Certainly,
the courts that heard Fifth Amendment challenges to hiring prefer-
ences in the early 197os did not understand the anticlassification prin-
ciple of Bolling v. Sharpe as a constitutional constraint on race-
conscious efforts to break down segregation in the construction indus-
try. 
190
189 See John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 723, 724-25 (1974). According to Ely:
There is some authority ... for the permissibility of "benign" racial classification.
Closest to the mark, perhaps, is the Supreme Court's dictum in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, making explicit its view that a local community may
bus children according to race, if it wishes, to remedy school segregation caused by resi-
dential patterns. No obvious distinctions come to mind by which voluntary busing
plans can be distinguished from other "benign" discrimination.
Id. at 724 (footnotes omitted); see also infra notes 201, 205.
190 In the early 1970s, federal courts upholding the use of racial hiring goals that had been
mandated by executive order for federal contractors in the construction industry tersely dismissed
Fifth Amendment challenges. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159,
176-77 (3 d Cir. 197) (rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that "the specific goals specified by the
[Philadelphia] Plan are racial quotas prohibited by the equal protection aspect of the Fifth
Amendment" on the ground that "[tihe Philadelphia Plan is valid Executive action designed to
remedy the perceived evil that minority tradesmen have not been included in the labor pool avail-
able for the performance of construction projects in which the federal government has a cost and
performance interest" and "[tihe Fifth Amendment does not prohibit such action").
In sustaining federal contracting affirmative action goals against a Fifth Amendment chal-
lenge in Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972), which upheld the
Ogilvie Plan for recruitment, placement, and training of minority group members in the highway
construction industry in certain Illinois counties, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the use of
racial goals was constitutionally permissible "to eliminate past discrimination." Id. at 681, 686.
This was an easily satisfied constraint: the court established the remedial predicate simply by cit-
ing another case involving firefighters in which racial hiring quotas had been approved as a rem-
edy for a proven constitutional violation. See id. at 686 & n.13 (citing Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315, 330-31 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc)). The court was similarly casual in substantiating its
assertion that "[t]he plan does not impermissibly prefer black persons nor does it discriminate
against white persons." Id. at 686. To demonstrate this point, the court reviewed the facts with
an end to showing that the plan was not inappropriately biased toward selection of black appli-
cants over other minority applicants. See id. at 686 n.i4.
For one account of the law in this period, see Associated General Contractors of Massachu-
setts, Inc. v. Altshuler, 49o F.2d 9, 16-17 (ist Cir. 1973), which upheld a state contract provision
requiring contractors to employ at least twenty percent minority workers:
The intentional, official recognition of race in the selection of union members or
construction workers has been constitutionally tested and upheld in two contexts. The
first is where courts have ordered, pursuant to Title VII ... , remedial action for past
discrimination....
The second context in which race has been recognized as a permissible criterion for
employment is where courts have upheld federal affirmative action programs against
challenges under the Equal Protection clause or under the anti-preference provisions of
Title VII .... Recognizing that the discretionary power of public authorities to remedy
past discrimination is even broader than that of the judicial branch, see Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg, [402 U.S. at i6]; cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966),
courts have upheld the specific percentage goals and time tables for minority hiring
found in the Philadelphia Plan, the Cleveland Plan, the Newark Plan, and the Illinois
Ogilvie Plan.
Altshuler, 49o F.2d at i6-I 7 (citations and parallel citations omitted).
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But by 1973, there was sufficient controversy over such programs
that even federal courts that upheld them were beginning to consider
at length the ways in which the Constitution might limit government
efforts to fight segregation. They began to express concern that racial
preferences in hiring might foster racial antagonism and to suggest
that at some as-yet-unreached point, the Constitution might impose
limits on such programs, either to protect the interests of dispreferred
whites or to protect preferred groups from racial backlash. 19 1 This
new concern with identifying potential constitutional limits on benign
or reverse discrimination resonated with the sense of racial conflict
that had driven the recent presidential elections.
It was, however, a particular form of race-conscious desegregative
activity that brought the question to a boil. In the 196os and early
1970s, courts had not imposed significant constitutional limits on race-
conscious action undertaken to ameliorate segregation in public
schools and in the construction industry, but they began to respond dif-
ferently when plaintiffs challenged new race-conscious measures de-
signed to help integrate the nation's universities. 192 With black cam-
pus protest on the rise, universities had begun expanding access for
minority candidates, at the same time that new financial aid programs
were beginning to offer children of less privileged white families the
opportunity to attend institutions of higher education; by 1971 race-
conscious admissions practices had become "an explosive political is-
sue" that the Nixon administration denounced. 193 It was a watershed
moment. In 1973, the Washington Supreme Court approved the use of
a racial preference in the state law school's admissions policy, reason-
191 Altshuler was one of the first cases seriously to consider the reverse-discrimination objection
to affirmative action requirements in government contracting. It ruled the hiring preferences con-
stitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, sustaining them against the claim that the Consti-
tution required colorblindness. Altshuler, 490 F.2d at 2o. At the same time, the court treated
these objections as constitutionally weighty in a way that previous decisions had not. See id. at
16-18.
192 In a 1971 article, Robert O'Neil reported that "minority-group enrollments at predomi-
nantly white institutions [had] increased sharply, ... largely from the application of special or
preferential admissions policies, combined with vigorous recruiting efforts and major commit-
ments of financial aid for disadvantaged students." Robert M. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions:
Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 8o YALE L.J. 699, 700-01 (1971)
(footnote omitted). O'Neil reported that "the percentage of entering minority undergraduates at
many institutions doubled in the fall of 1968 and doubled again the following year. A similar ex-
pansion of minority enrollments [had] also occurred at the graduate level." Id. at 701.
193 O'Neil reported that these admissions practices had become "an explosive political issue,"
owing partly to a series of speeches by Vice President Spiro Agnew in 197o and 1971 that attacked
preferential admissions. Id. at 699 & n.i. O'Neil observed that "the pressure for expansion of
minority enrollments collides directly with the rising academic aspirations and expectations of
many lower middle class whites for whom college has for the first time in generations become a
serious prospect." Id. at 7oo. For an account of black campus protest, see Bell, supra note 165, at
290 & n.103, 294-96.
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ing, just as courts had done throughout the I96os, that the presump-
tion against racial classification was an asymmetric constraint:
"Clearly, consideration of race by school authorities does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment where the purpose is to bring together,
rather than separate, the races. ' 194  On review by the United States
Supreme Court, DeFunis v. Odegaard'9 generated a firestorm of con-
troversy. The Court sidestepped the controversy, declaring the case
moot.196  But from this point forward, the question was differently
framed: what kinds of constitutional limits did the presumption
against racial classification impose on race-conscious efforts to amelio-
rate segregation?
Claims about the harms that desegregation inflicted played a cen-
tral role in transforming judicial application of the presumption
against racial classifications. In his DeFunis dissent, Justice Douglas
argued that the case of race-conscious admissions in law schools was
materially different from prior cases allowing race-conscious assign-
ment in public schools. In Justice Douglas's view, this was the disap-
pointed law school applicant's only chance to attend a state school,
whereas parents resisting race-conscious assignment policies in the
elementary and secondary schools had a state-provided alternative to
their school of choice, and thus no ground for constitutional com-
plaint. 197 Attempting to distinguish the passage in Swann that author-
ized government to consider race in the design of school assignment
policies, Justice Douglas emphasized that "no one has a right to attend
a segregated public school"; 198 this claim, however, ignored the fact
that the relevant passage of Swann authorized voluntary integration
efforts at public schools where there was no finding of a constitutional
violation, 99 and so concerned schools no more "segregated" than the
state's law school was. In striking down a race-conscious admissions
program at the U.C. Davis School of Medicine - the same program
the U.S. Supreme Court would ultimately confront in Bakke - the
California Supreme Court also sought to distinguish the long line of
cases allowing race-conscious public school assignments by emphasiz-
194 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1I6q, 1i8i (Wash. 1973) (en banc) (holding that a state law
school could consider race as a factor in admissions), vacated, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
195 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
196 The Court held:
Because the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the end of the term for
which he has now registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the
merits of this litigation, we conclude that the Court cannot, consistently with the limita-
tions of Art. EI of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues ten-
dered by the parties.
Id. at 319-20.
197 See id. at 336 n.18 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
198 Id.
199 See supra pp. 1517-18.
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ing the special character of the harm involved in denial of admission
to professional school. It argued that "[t]he disadvantages suffered by
a child who must attend school some distance from his home or is
transferred to a school not of his qualitative choice cannot be equated
with the absolute denial of a professional education";20 0 this assertion
prompted the dissenting justice to complain that the cases permitting
voluntary integration of public schools and the cases upholding the use
of employment goals and timetables in federal contracts provided am-
ple constitutional precedent for the practice that the court had invali-
dated.201
Were the cases different? Owen Fiss was surely right to observe
that the question of race-conscious admissions in professional schools
was debated as a "preference" while Swann was characterized as a
case of "racial assignment. '20 2  Fiss pointed out that it was the "scar-
city" of the allocated good that appeared to distinguish them:
Conceivably, the resource at the elementary and secondary school level
could have been defined in such a way as to make scarcity predominate:
the resource could have been defined, not as "going to some school," but
rather as "going to a particular school," for example, the neighborhood
school or the school with the best reputation. But in fact the resource at
the elementary and secondary school level was not so perceived by the
Court in Swann.
20 3
In other words, the legal system was beginning to treat differently
what was at stake in two potentially similar cases. Were parents who
protested government efforts to correct racial imbalance in public
school assignments merely expressing a constitutionally suspect taste
for racial exclusivity, or did school assignments in fact distribute
unique goods with real differences in educational opportunity? If they
did, was there nonetheless a reason to treat race-conscious desegrega-
tion initiatives in secondary and post-secondary education differ-
200 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1161 (Cal. 1976), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (978).
201 Id. at I 179 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). Justice Tobriner observed:
[Tihe employment cases are by no means the only instance in which judicially-
sanctioned benign racial classifications have "deprived" nonminorities of a benefit on the
basis of their race. Although the majority maintain that the benign racial classifications
employed in school desegregation do not have such an effect, that assertion clearly fails.
In the first place, no one can realistically assert that white-Anglo students who have
been transferred from schools with better facilities and more experienced teachers to
presently "unequal" schools as part of the desegregation process have not suffered at
least some detriment that they would not have suffered "but for" their race. The fact
that such children have "no right to a segregated education" does not distinguish past
desegregation decisions from the instant case since it is equally true that medical school
applicants have no right to a segregated medical education.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Bakke, 553 P2d at 1161).
202 See Fiss, School Desegregation, supra note 127, at 8.
203 Id.
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ently?20 4  Majority-group objections to race-conscious professional
school admissions policies played an important role in the policies'
emergent characterization as racial classifications subject to the pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality.205 Fiss and others now began openly
to consider public judgments about the equities of race-conscious gov-
ernmental programs as a determining factor in constitutional analysis.
John Kaplan spoke to the appearances question quite frankly:
We are constantly forced to compromise the strong moral claims of the
Negro, because the structure of the institutions of our society interfere[s]
with the implementation of what otherwise might appear to be a just re-
sult. Moreover, the necessity of considering not only the reality of gov-
ernmental action, but also its appearance, may justify the belief that in
this area we cannot afford complete openness and frankness on the part of
the legislature, executive or judiciary. Though this may shock some, it
perhaps is an inevitable consequence of our history. One should not ex-
pect to find within what would be our traditional morality a just cure for
three hundred years of immorality.
20 6
In short, judgments about the harm to white applicants in the pro-
fessional school affirmative action cases seem to underlie, and partly to
account for, courts' newfound willingness to interpret and apply the
204 See id. at 8-9. There are many ways one could distinguish the cases: by emphasizing that
higher education involved a case of meritocratic admissions, or that higher education involved a
good of greater value to the middle class, or that access to professional education (especially law
school) might have mattered differently to lawyers. Or it may be that the racial dimensions of the
conflict in the public school context were more visible, or seemed more constitutionally salient, in
the decade after Brown. No doubt these factors interacted and together contributed to the per-
ception that race-conscious desegregation initiatives in post-secondary education were constitu-
tionally problematic in ways that such initiatives in elementary and secondary education were
not.
205 In 1969, Norman Vieira suggested that differences in public response would move courts to
characterize some race-conscious assignment and admissions policies as racial classifications sub-
ject to the presumption of unconstitutionality. While he observed that all the programs he dis-
cussed could be characterized as policies that "classify by race in the sense that a purpose of the
state's action is to affect the racial composition of schools," some programs that he considered
"seem[ed] constitutionally unassailable" to him while others did not. Vieira, supra note 126, at
6 17. Specifically, Vieira wrote:
Supreme Court decisions do not indicate a difference of constitutional dimensions be-
tween neighborhood and individual classification by race. Yet, to many observers, dif-
ferential treatment seems to be less offensive when it embodies judgments in gross. Ra-
cial classification of neighborhoods would call for like treatment of all people within a
given geographical area and would not involve courts in the obnoxious business of de-
termining a person's race.
Id.
Vieira did not see a difference in principle among the forms of race-conscious public school
assignment that he considered, but he was exquisitely sensitive to the public's likely perception of
their fairness, and suggested that public intuitions about the equities of the practice would guide
judicial judgments about whether the different assignment policies should be characterized as
racial classifications subject to the presumption of unconstitutionality. See, e.g., id. at 1616-17.
206 John Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem of
Special Treatment, 6i NW. U. L. REV 363, 4IO (1966).
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constitutional presumption against racial classifications in a way they
had not in the i96os: as a constraint on voluntary governmental efforts
to rectify racial imbalance in educational institutions.
When the California Supreme Court employed strict scrutiny to
strike down the admissions program in Bakke in 1976, it proceeded
with the understanding that it was using the presumption against ra-
cial classification and the strict scrutiny framework in a new way -
and with evident confidence that it was right to do so. If the harm of
racial discrimination that a disappointed white applicant experienced
did not have the elements of "stigma" that a black applicant might ex-
perience, the majority reasoned, that harm was nonetheless of suffi-
cient magnitude to warrant equal protection. 20 7  In so reasoning, the
court was rejecting an argument for race-asymmetric application of
the presumption against racial classifications prominently advanced by
Judge Skelly Wright,20  one that Justice Powell would impugn with
passion in Bakke:
In the view of Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice
Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun, the pliable notion of "stigma" is the
crucial element in analyzing racial classifications. The Equal Protection
Clause is not framed in terms of "stigma." Certainly the word has no
clearly defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a subjective judgment
that is standardless. All state-imposed classifications that rearrange bur-
dens and benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep re-
sentment by the individuals burdened. The denial to innocent persons of
equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so deprived and there-
fore may be perceived as invidious. These individuals are likely to find
little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is
merely the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its im-
207 See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ, of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1163 (Cal. 1976). Justice Mosk
wrote:
That whites suffer a grievous disadvantage by reason of their exclusion from the
University on racial grounds is abundantly clear. The fact that they are not also invidi-
ously discriminated against in the sense that a stigma is cast upon them because of their
race, as is often the circumstance when the discriminatory conduct is directed against a
minority, does not justify the conclusion that race is a suspect classification only if the
consequences of the classification are detrimental to minorities.
Id.
208 See J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society - Judicial
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. i, i8 (1968). Judge Wright wrote:
[T]he function of equal protection ... is to shield groups or individuals from stigmatiza-
tion by government. Whether or not particular legislation stigmatizes is largely a socio-
logical question requiring consideration of the structure and history of our society as
well as examination of the statute itself. Legislation favoring Negroes, then, would be
constitutional because it is rational and because in our society it would not stigmatize
whites.
Id.; see also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 5o6-o8 (D.D.C. 1967) (discussing the particular
need for heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative and administrative judgments that burden ra-
cial minorities and the poor).
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position is inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others.
One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the percep-
tion of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and
privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic origin.
20 9
Justice Powell refused to limit classification discourse to policing
the kinds of stigmatic harms suffered by members of socially subordi-
nate groups. "Stigma" was not a constitutional term of art and, for
Justice Powell, presented no ground on which the Court might differ-
entiate between the harm that race discrimination inflicted on minori-
ties and the harm that a race-preferential admissions policy imposed
on members of the "dominant majority." If the Constitution was con-
cerned about the dignitary and distributive harms that racial segrega-
tion inflicted on blacks, it also ought to concern itself with the digni-
tary and distributive harms that efforts to disestablish segregation
inflicted on members of the "dominant majority." Of course, the Court
was not in the business of protecting disappointed applicants from the
ordinary and inevitable distributive consequences of admissions poli-
cies. Justice Powell urged judicial intervention to protect disappointed
applicants from the distributive effects of admissions policies seeking
to alleviate de facto segregation, because of the intense forms of "out-
rage" and "resentment" such policies provoked - the fierce "percep-
tion of mistreatment" that race-based efforts to rectify segregation pro-
voked in members of the "dominant majority." Urging constitutional
solicitude for this special form of status harm, Justice Powell famously
emphasized: "The guarantees of equal protection . . . 'are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, with-
out regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws. '",210
In deep ways, Justice Powell's Bakke opinion resonated with
themes voiced two decades earlier in passionate debates over Brown's
Footnote Eleven and neutral principles. What harms and whose
harms were of constitutional consequence? In treating as commensu-
rable the harms that segregation inflicted on subordinate groups and
the harms that desegregation initiatives inflicted on superordinate
groups, Justice Powell's opinion seemed to adopt the reasoning of
Brown's early critics. But even as the opinion moved to give constitu-
tional recognition to the harms that desegregation initiatives inflicted
on majority group members, it did so in ways that marked Brown's
growing legal and cultural authority. A telling sign of Brown's institu-
tionalization in the intervening decades was Justice Powell's rationale
209 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(citation omitted).
210 Id. at 292-93 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
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for rejecting a group-asymmetric, or - in his words - "two-class" in-
terpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. It "was no longer possible
to peg the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for
equality of one racial minority," Justice Powell argued; "[d]uring the
dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had be-
come a Nation of minorities."2"' Justice Powell addressed members of
the "dominant majority" as "minorities" who needed courts to protect
them from the discrimination that race-conscious desegregation initia-
tives might inflict on them. The opinion protected whites by extend-
ing - rather than limiting - Brown's authority, charging federal
judges with responsibility for protecting whites from race discrimina-
tion in the political process, a role judges had previously played only
for racial minorities.
Yet Justice Powell's Bakke opinion accepted the analogy between
the race discrimination claims of majority and minority groups only to
a point. In quiet ways, Justice Powell understood that members of su-
perordinate and subordinate groups were differently situated, and in
constitutionally significant ways. Even as he rejected a race-
asymmetric or antisubordination framework for interpreting the pre-
sumption against racial classifications, Justice Powell offered the na-
tion a master compromise in the concept of "diversity" itself - a
framework that would allow limited voluntary race-conscious efforts
at desegregation to continue, in a social form that would preserve the
Constitution as a domain of neutral principles.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES: ANTISUBORDINATION AND ANTICLASSIFICATION
VALUES IN MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
In the last quarter-century, Justice Powell's Bakke opinion has
played a central role in debates over affirmative action. Its authority
has no doubt been due to the artful ways in which it limited yet
obliquely enabled practices about which the nation was deeply di-
vided. At one and the same time, the opinion affirmed the importance
of equal and individualized admissions criteria and allowed institu-
tions of higher education to employ admissions policies that would in-
crease the number of minority students admitted. The opinion said no
and yes to race-conscious admissions policies; it employed anticlassifi-
cation discourse to constrain, but not to block, race-asymmetric admis-
sions standards in higher education.
What is the relationship between Brown and Bakke? A simple and
familiar account imagines Brown as resting on the principle that it is
211 Id. at 292.
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wrong to classify on the basis of race and Justice Powell's Bakke opin-
ion as applying that principle to protect whites against "reverse dis-
crimination." On this account, affirmation of the anticlassification
principle entails a repudiation of antisubordination values and a reaf-
firmation that the Constitution protects all individuals - not just cer-
tain groups - from state-sponsored discrimination.' 1 2  Though this
account of the modern equal protection tradition contains elements of
truth, it nevertheless mischaracterizes Brown, Bakke, and the tradition
of which they are a part.
The history linking the debates over Footnote Eleven to Bakke
suggests that the relation of anticlassification and antisubordination
values in the modern equal protection tradition is considerably more
complex than conventional accounts would have it. As this Article has
shown, the anticlassification principle that Justice Powell deployed in
Bakke was not the ground of the Brown decision, but instead is the re-
siduum of conflicts over enforcing Brown. The presumption that ra-
cial classifications are unconstitutional - and the reasons and com-
monsense understandings regulating the application of that
presumption - are the product of social struggle over the project of
disestablishing segregation that Brown inaugurated. It was as the na-
tion argued over Brown's justification and implementation that the
Court began to rely on anticlassification discourse, first to express, and
then to limit, antisubordination values.
If a principle is a norm of conduct that vindicates a value, then
courts have not applied the presumption that the state should not clas-
sify on the basis of race as a principle in any simple sense. Instead,
courts have applied this presumption of unconstitutionality selectively,
and in a manner that has shifted over time, to vindicate multiple and
sometimes conflicting social concerns. As we have seen, at some points
in our history, claims about the wrongs of racial classification have
served to express and to mask constitutional concerns about practices
that enforce second-class citizenship for members of relatively power-
less social groups - and at some points in our history, claims about
the wrongs of racial classification have served to diffuse and to limit
expression of such concerns. When, for example, Justice Powell as-
serted that "[t]he guarantees of equal protection 'are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality ,,,, he
was denying that the Constitution protected individuals by virtue of
their group membership and asserting that the Constitution was
equally solicitous of the welfare of members of superordinate and
212 See supra p. 1472 and sources cited supra note io.
213 See supra p. i531.
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subordinate groups. Yet, as we have seen, even as Justice Powell as-
serted this account of the values that the presumption against racial
classification vindicated, he proposed "diversity" as a compelling state
interest that would allow state actors to consider race in university
admissions for purposes of increasing, but not decreasing, minority
group admissions.
In concluding, this Article considers how attending to the complex
range of values that anticlassification discourse vindicates can alter
our understanding of the modern equal protection tradition, and the
character of constitutional principles themselves.
A. The Anticlassification Principle as Residuum of
Social Struggle over Brown
The concerns and values that moved Americans to invoke the pre-
sumption that racial classifications are unconstitutional shifted signifi-
cantly in the decades after Brown. As we have seen, in the I95os and
I96os, many of Brown's prominent defenders in the legal academy jus-
tified the decision as condemning practices that enforced group ine-
quality.21 4 And in the years after the Supreme Court first announced
the presumption that state action classifying on the basis of race was
unconstitutional, courts applied that presumption in accordance with
an understanding, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, that its
purpose was to dismantle segregation and other practices that enforced
racial hierarchy.2 15 In this period, segregation was understood as
wrongful both because it failed to treat members of a group as indi-
viduals and because it treated one group as inferior to another, and
there was little felt sense that expressing segregation's harm in terms
of a presumption that racial classification was unconstitutional
amounted to a choice between the accounts of the harm. There was
then nothing in dispute that made distinguishing between these ac-
counts of the harm salient. But in time, as the struggle over desegre-
gation unfolded and shifted away from the question of whether courts
would intervene in segregation to the question of when and how, the
meaning of the presumption came to be increasingly contested.
21 6
214 See supra section IC, pp. 1489-97. Louis Pollak, for example, suggested a rewrite of Brown
that expertly employed the presumption against racial classification to alleviate the burden of
proving the harms that segregation inflicted on blacks. See supra p. 1492. In the early I96OS,
Alexander Bickel countered questions concerning benign discrimination by asserting that an anti-
classification principle would have to be applied flexibly, to strike down only those forms of racial
classification that enforced racial "inferiority." See supra note 17 1.
215 See supra pp. 1516-21, 1524-29.
216 See generally section II.C, pp. 1513-32.
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By 1976, when Owen Fiss wrote Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause,2 17 the social values vindicated by the presumption against ra-
cial classification were in hot dispute. Fiss entered this debate to make
the case that the Equal Protection Clause was best understood in
terms of a mediating principle that prohibits "laws and practices that
aggravate [or perpetuate] the subordinate position of a specially disad-
vantaged group."2 18  Fiss contrasted this group-disadvantaging (or an-
tisubordination) principle with the antidiscrimination (or anticlassifica-
tion) principle that then served as a mediating principle for the Equal
Protection Clause, and he offered a politically savvy account of why
anticlassification discourse had authority and appeal.2 19  Fiss demon-
strated that the objectivity, individualism, and nonsubstantivity of an-
ticlassification discourse were aspirational only, and that antisubordi-
nation values guided doctrinal elaboration of the anticlassification
principle at crucial turns.
220
This demonstration was no mere scholarly exercise. Fiss urgently
called for clarification of the normative commitments undergirding
equal protection jurisprudence because the Court was then addressing
questions of affirmative action and de facto segregation, and Fiss was
concerned that, as to these issues, "the antidiscrimination principle ei-
ther provides no framework of analysis or, even worse, provides the
wrong one."'221  Fiss proposed the group-disadvantaging principle to
guide resolution of questions concerning the "permissibility of prefer-
ential treatment 222 and the "problem of facially innocent criteria" 223 in
a fashion that would remain faithful to Brown.124  Because concern
about harm to specially disadvantaged groups was at the root of the
equal protection tradition, Fiss argued, under the Equal Protection
Clause the state could facially discriminate in favor of members of
217 Fiss, supra note 8.
218 Id. at 157.
219 Fiss observed that anticlassification discourse seemed objective and determinate in applica-
tion; that it hid its concern with fairness to groups and justified itself by emphasizing fairness to
individuals; and that it disclaimed reliance on any substantive ends. See id. at i 8-2 9.
220 See id. at 118-36.
221 Id. at 129.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 141.
224 As I have elsewhere argued, "we can understand Fiss as expressing the normative commit-
ments of the 'Second Reconstruction' in rhetorical terms that might enable continued critical en-
gagement with the world the civil rights movement brought into being." Reva B. Siegel, Dis-
crimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes
Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, iii (2000) [hereinafter Siegel, Discrimination in the
Eyes of the Law]; cf Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. iI'l, 1i1 (997) (observing the dynamic of
preservation through transformation, in which "the rules and reasons the legal system employs to
enforce status relationships evolve as they are contested," and therefore urging that antidiscrimi-
nation law adopt a framework that is attentive to this dynamic).
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subordinate groups and could not engage in facially neutral practices
that harmed them, unless the imposition was justified by some weighty
and overriding public need.
Of course, we know that the Court decided Washington v. Davis
225
and Bakke differently from how Fiss urged. In Davis, and subse-
quently in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,2 26 the Court deployed
the presumption against classification restrictively, to limit the kinds of
state-inflicted harms that would count as equal protection violations.
State action was now "neutral" and "equal," however disproportion-
ately it harmed minorities, unless it employed a suspect classification
or reflected discriminatory purpose, a concept the Court related back
to forms of racial animus or "antipathy" that the presumption against
classification was intended to constrain.2 27  In Davis and Feeney the
225 426 U.S. 229 (I976).
226 442 U.S. 256 (979).
227 In Davis, the Court upheld a test for employment in the District of Columbia police de-
partment, even though four times as many black as white applicants failed the test. Davis, 426
U.S. at 237. In ruling that use of the test did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
drew on the anticlassification principle to limit the class of governmental practices that violated
the Equal Protection Clause:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply be-
cause it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimi-
nation forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (Y964), that racial classifications are to be subjected
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (parallel citation omitted). To challenge facially neutral governmental
practices with disparate effects on minorities, plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice was animated by discriminatory purpose. See id. at 239.
In Feeney, the Court held that an absolute hiring preference for veterans in state civil ser-
vice employment was constitutional, even though the district court found that it had a "devastat-
ing impact" on women's employment opportunities - an impact that the Court assumed was
"foreseeable." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260, 278. In Feeney, the Court again drew upon the concept of
classification to restrict the reach of the Equal Protection Clause:
Certain classifications . . . in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is
the paradigm. A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presump-
tively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification. Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184. This rule ap-
plies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for ra-
cial discrimination. But, as was made clear in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, and
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 [(I977)], even if a
neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconsti-
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a dis-
criminatory purpose.
The cases of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp. recognize that when a neutral law has a disparate impact upon a group that
has historically been the victim of discrimination, an unconstitutional purpose may still
be at work. But those cases signaled no departure from the settled rule that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.
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Court applied the concept of classification restrictively, to limit the
kinds of government-inflicted harm to minority groups that the Equal
Protection Clause would constrain, while in Bakke five members of the
Court applied the concept of classification expansively, in a manner
that was newly and significantly solicitous of the harms that race-
conscious desegregation initiatives might inflict on majority-group
members.2 2 8  Antisubordination values most certainly did not guide
application of the anticlassification principle in these cases; to the con-
trary, in Davis and Bakke the Court employed anticlassification dis-
course to limit antisubordination values.
If we understand anticlassification and antisubordination as agonis-
tic principles that refer to the choices the Court faced in Davis and
Bakke, then it follows that the Court embraced anticlassification and
repudiated antisubordination when it decided these cases and refused
to make equal protection doctrine responsive to concerns of group dis-
advantage as Fiss urged. This is the conventional understanding of
Fourteenth Amendment case law,22 9 yet it profoundly misapprehends
the modern equal protection tradition. It is not simply that antisubor-
dination values played a central role in justifying Brown throughout
the 1950s, or that, during the I96os and 197os, antisubordination val-
ues were expressed through, and guided application of, the presump-
tion that racial classifications are unconstitutional. It is that, even in
the 1970s, when the Court began to use anticlassification discourse to
limit rather than express antisubordination values, it never embraced
one understanding of equal protection to the exclusion of the other.
The Court first recognized that sex-based state action could violate the
Id. at 272-73 (citations and parallel citations omitted). The Court then proceeded to define dis-
criminatory purpose as involving a mental state akin to malice:
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legisla-
ture, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not
merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
Id. at 279 (footnote and citation omitted).
228 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). In the discriminatory
purpose line of cases, the Court employed the concept of classification to enforce a restrictive un-
derstanding of the harm triggering an equal protection violation. It suggested that classification
was the sole kind of harm against which the Equal Protection Clause protected, and then sug-
gested that facially neutral state action with a racially disparate impact would violate the clause
only if it was motivated by the mental state that the Court presumably understood to animate the
use of racial classifications - racial disrespect or hostility. It is hard to square this restrictive ac-
count of an equal protection violation with the affirmative action cases, both because the affirma-
tive action cases add to the range of harms that can constitute an equal protection violation, and
because they treat classification as a wrongful practice when animated by mental states other
than those the discriminatory purpose cases insist are required elements of a violation. The
analysis in the text suggests one important framework in which to reconcile the apparent discrep-
ancy between the two lines of cases.
229 See sources cited supra note io.
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Equal Protection Clause in the 1970s, in a line of cases that employed
the concept of classification to define and to limit the kinds of prac-
tices that are constitutionally cognizable as sex discrimination, 230 yet
nonetheless deemed classification a constitutional wrong in significant
part because it might enforce or perpetuate the "inferiority" of women
as a group.2 31 One cannot understand the shape and movement of an-
ticlassification discourse in modern equal protection law without ap-
preciating how and why it expresses, masks, and limits antisubordina-
tion concerns.
Consider the Court's most recent affirmative action decisions. A
majority of the Court adopted the rationale of Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger232 and held that public universities
could promote the diversity of their student bodies by considering race
as one factor in the admissions process, so long as the admissions offi-
cers continued to evaluate every applicant as an individual.2 33  The
Grutter opinion demonstrates the central role that antisubordination
values continue to play in equal protection case law, even as it poign-
antly illustrates the great lengths to which the Court will go to disguise
and to limit antisubordination values in interpreting the Constitution.
Grutter does not simply incorporate Justice Powell's diversity ra-
tionale for race-conscious admissions practices into the fabric of consti-
tutional law. Grutter transforms the diversity rationale in the course of
adopting it, expanding the concept of diversity so that it explicitly em-
braces antisubordination values. In Grutter, diversity is no longer
merely the state's interest in ensuring that the learning environment in
institutions of higher education is populated by persons of divergent
life experience; the opinion also explains the value of diversity as the
230 A plurality of the Court applied heightened scrutiny to sex-based state action in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973), and the full Court adopted the standard in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 0976). In this same period, the Court ruled that plaintiffs could challenge state
action as discriminating against women only if it employed a sex-based classification of certain
doctrinal specifications. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275 (ruling that a policy giving a civil-service
hiring preference to veterans did not employ a sex-based classification within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (974) (ruling that policy de-
nying employment benefits to pregnant women did not employ a sex-based classification within
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause). For one account of the organizing role that the con-
cept of classification plays in the sex discrimination case law, see Reva B. Siegel, She the People:
The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 1I5 HARV. L. REV. 947,
953-60 (2002).
231 See Frontiero, 4'1 U.S. at 684-88 (plurality opinion) (reasoning that the Equal Protection
Clause requires strict scrutiny of sex-based state classification because the discriminatory treat-
ment directed at women over the course of the nation's history in important respects resembles
the treatment of blacks); United States v. Virginia, 5i8 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (explaining that, under
standards of heightened scrutiny, sex "classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create
or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women" (citation omitted)).
232 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
233 See id. at 2341-42.
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value of an educated citizenry in a democratic society.234 As it does so,
the opinion defines the state's interest in achieving "diversity" as an
interest in ensuring that no group is excluded from participating in
public life and thus relegated to an outsider, or second-class status, as
well as an interest in cultivating the confidence of all citizens that they
have the opportunity to serve in positions of national leadership, even
if members of their group are currently underrepresented there. 235
Grutter openly acknowledges that the state has a compelling inter-
est in considering the race of applicants to a public university to en-
sure that no group will be systematically excluded from positions of
civic leadership and influence. Yet the Court masks the antisubordi-
nation rationale for its decision and imposes practical requirements on
the admissions process designed to limit its institutional expression.
Justice O'Connor's opinion emphasizes that "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 'protect[s] persons, not groups"'236 and repeatedly distances itself
from group-based justifications for affirmative action. 37 Although
Grutter discusses the considerations of social justice and political le-
234 Id. at 2339-40. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning
the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 11I7 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6o-6i (2003).
235 In explaining the university's compelling interest in student diversity, the Court observes:
The United States, as amicus curiae, affirms that "[e]nsuring that public institutions are
open and available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and
ethnicities, represents a paramount government objective." And, "[n]owhere is the im-
portance of such openness more acute than in the context of higher education." Effec-
tive participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Na-
tion is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.
Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground
for a large number of our Nation's leaders....
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individu-
als of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have
confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training.... Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive
of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of
our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that provide
the training and education necessary to succeed in America.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting the amicus brief
submitted by the United States).
236 Id. at 2337 (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 ('995)).
237 See, e.g., id. at 2336 (reciting Justice Powell's repudiation of justifications for affirmative
action concerned with the social status of minority groups); id. at 2339 (observing that the law
school's interest in admitting a "critical mass" of minority students is an interest in the educa-
tional benefits that flow from diversity, and not merely an interest in admitting a fixed percentage
of a particular group because of its race, which would "amount to outright racial balancing, which
is patently unconstitutional"); cf Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2oo2 Term-Comment: Admis-
sions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, I 17 HARV. L.
REV. 113, 176 (2003) ("For Justice O'Connor, . .. not all efforts to achieve democratic legitimacy
through diversity are equal. Sponsored mobility is a legitimate means to achieve the benefits of
racial diversity, but only if the decisionmakers do not treat race as a fixed, bounded category.").
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gitimacy raised by a social order in which members of some groups are
perpetually excluded from positions of national leadership, it refers to
these concerns in the familiar and comfortingly vague nomenclature of
"diversity," and insists that university admissions officers employ the
associated concept of "critical mass" to justify attending to the num-
bers of minority group members admitted. 38 Finally, Grutter and its
companion case2 3 9 impose a set of institutional restrictions that mask
consideration of race in admissions and emphasize the constitutional
entitlement of every applicant to be considered as an "individual."
This entitlement to be treated as an individual has no functional sig-
nificance in equal protection doctrine other than as a constraint on
consideration of race (or other protected statuses) in university admis-
sions and other distributive contexts.
240
At every turn, Grutter deploys anticlassification discourse to limit
and to disguise the expression of antisubordination values. The case
demonstrates the Court's deep desire to shield interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause from concerns about groups, social structure,
caste, and subordination. In other words, Grutter fervently warns
against interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in terms of the very
values the decision in fact vindicates. Protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding, Grutter embodies an antisubordination understand-
ing of the clause. Grutter understands that the presumption against
racial classifications is concerned with racial hierarchy; the decision al-
lows racial allocation of educational opportunities when the state is
seeking to inhibit or break down caste relations, so long as the state
acts in a fashion that will not unduly exacerbate race consciousness or
arouse the resentment of majority group members .
4 '
238 See sources cited supra note 237.
239 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
240 The Court observes:
As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that
race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate that univer-
sities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of
those groups on separate admissions tracks. Nor can universities insulate applicants
who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission. Uni-
versities can, however, consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a "plus" factor in the
context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342 (citations omitted). Within equal protection doctrine, being treated as
an "individual" has a specialized meaning. Applicants who are evaluated as individuals can be
categorized and valued on the basis of any trait (for example, grades, standardized test scores,
parental income, residence, high school, alumni affiliations, or musical or athletic ability) except
race. See Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law, supra note 224, at 92-93 ("It is crucial to
note that, within color blindness discourse, the right to be treated as an 'individual' entitles per-
sons to protection from classification on the basis of formal-race only.").
241 Justice O'Connor's earlier opinions applied strict scrutiny to inhibit open or institutional-
ized reference to race in public life. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
505-o6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J.) ("To accept Richmond's claim that past societal
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As we appreciate the complex set of values that anticlassification
discourse vindicates in Grutter, it is possible to see the same dynamic
at work elsewhere in equal protection case law. Consider the line of
cases concerning de facto discrimination. It is generally assumed that
when the Court required plaintiffs challenging facially neutral state
action to prove discriminatory purpose, it was embracing anticlassifi-
cation values and repudiating antisubordination values. 42 Yet even
discriminatory purpose doctrine rests on a race-asymmetric under-
standing of the Equal Protection Clause. Discriminatory purpose cases
typically concern facially neutral state action that benefits majority
groups. The Court has treated facially neutral allocations that benefit
minority groups differently: the Court's affirmative action cases re-
peatedly suggest that facially neutral, racially allocative state action
that benefits subordinate groups is constitutionally permissible. 43 The
discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door
to competing claims for 'remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation
of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement
would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past
wrongs."). At the same time, she has employed both symmetric and asymmetric frameworks of
analysis to allow preferences for minority group members, despite the injury these preferences
may inflict on majority group members, in affirmative action programs that meet the Court's ex-
acting standard of review. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30 ("According to Justice Stevens, our
view of consistency 'equate[s] remedial preferences with invidious discrimination' . . . and ignores
the difference between 'an engine of oppression' and an effort 'to foster equality in society,' or,
more colorfully, 'between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat.' It does nothing of the
kind.... The principle of consistency explains the circumstances in which the injury requiring
strict scrutiny occurs. The application of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the infliction of that injury." (quoting id. at 243, 245-46 (Stevens,
J., dissenting))). For a nuanced account of the commitments that have shaped Justice O'Connor's
affirmative action jurisprudence, see Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1763-67 (1996).
242 See sources cited supra note io.
243 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 ("Universities in California, Florida, and Washington State,
where racial preferences in admissions are prohibited by state law, are currently engaged in ex-
perimenting with a wide variety of alternative approaches. Universities in other States can and
should draw on the most promising of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop."); Croson,
488 U.S. at 509-1o (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J.) ("Even in the absence of evidence of dis-
crimination, the city has at its disposal a whole array of race-neutral devices to increase the
accessibility of city contracting opportunities to small entrepreneurs of all races."); id. at 526
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A State can, of course, act 'to undo the effects of past
discrimination' in many permissible ways that do not involve classification by race.... Such
programs may well have racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race."). For
similar arguments in the lower courts, see Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3 d
344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1998); and Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3 d 147, 161 (4 th Cir. 1994). But see Ian
Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1784 (1996) (arguing that race-neutral means of
increasing minority enrollment should be subject to strict scrutiny and may not be more narrowly
tailored than explicit racial classifications).
Depending on how one characterizes the practice of race-conscious redistricting, the Court's
redistricting cases might represent a partial exception to this characterization of equal protection
law. If one counts race-conscious districting as a race-conscious form of state action akin to af-
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debate leading up to Grutter graphically illustrated the race-
asymmetric basis of discriminatory purpose doctrine. Many urged fa-
cially neutral "percent plans" as an alternative to race-conscious af-
firmative action.2 44  In this debate, there were some who argued that
facially neutral racially allocative state action was unconstitutional,
but no one questioned the racially allocative aim of increasing minority
access to higher education in the way they would have questioned a
university's openly stated aim to increase the number of white stu-
dents admitted.24s Thus, even though discriminatory purpose doctrine
is derived from anticlassification discourse - facially neutral state ac-
tion with a racially disparate impact is racially "neutral" only with ref-
erence to the concept of classification itself - the judiciary has devel-
oped the concept of discriminatory purpose with sensitivity to the
social status of groups that government benefits and burdens. It turns
out that, even in the area of discriminatory purpose doctrine, the
Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted in ways that vindicate
concerns about group subordination.
In fact, concerns about subordination shape the concept of classifi-
cation itself. American antidiscrimination law has no determinate cri-
teria for deciding what practices are group-based classifications, and
while courts sometimes articulate such criteria, they often apply them
inconsistently; as this inconsistency reveals, judgments about whether
firmative action itself, then these cases have no bearing on the question. But if one counts race-
conscious redistricting as facially neutral, racially allocative state action, then this line of cases
might be read as imposing constraints on the ways government can assist minority communities
by facially neutral means, without prohibiting the practice. The difficulty of determining whether
race-conscious redistricting is a practice that, like affirmative action, employs racial classifications
illustrates indeterminacies in the concept of racial classification itself. See infra pp. 1543-44. For
a probing account of irregularities in the Court's deployment of doctrine in this context, see Pam-
ela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting
Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569 (2oo2). Cf id. at 1582 (discussing "the Court's creative ex-
tension of Feeney"). Like the affirmative action cases, the redistricting cases impose certain limi-
tations on practices that assist minority communities, while continuing to differentiate between
race-conscious practices undertaken to benefit minority and majority communities.
244 For citation of prominent conservative commentators advocating the use of race-neutral
means to increase minority enrollment, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of
Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2349 n.75 (2001).
245 While several articles contend that facially neutral measures designed to benefit minorities
might under some circumstances be unconstitutional, see, e.g., id. at 2335-36; Stylianois-loannis
G. Koutnatzis, Affirmative Action in Education: The Trust and Honesty Perspective, 7 TEX. F.
ON C.L. & CR. 187 (2oo2), none mention any cases that have actually invalidated a program on
these grounds. Other articles come to the conclusion that such "alternative action" policies would
be found constitutional if litigated. See Paul Diller, Note, Integration Without Classification:
Moving Toward Race-Neutrality in the Pursuit of Public Elementary and Secondary School Di-
versity, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1999, 2042-45 (2001); see also Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race
and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 591-92 (2001) (describing how appellate and trial
courts have upheld facially neutral programs, particularly outreach and recruitment programs,
clearly motivated by a purpose to benefit minorities).
1542 [VOL. I17:1470
HeinOnline -- 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1542 2003-2004
2004] ANTIS UBORDINATION AND ANTICLASSIFICATION 1543
practices are constitutionally suspect classifications are normative as
well as positive. 246  Such judgments often depend on intuitions -
shaped by social movement advocacy - about whether the practice
unjustly perpetuates group inequality. For example, in the era of the
Brown decision, racial data collection was challenged as a suspect
form of race-based state action, but this understanding changed when
the practice was incorporated into the enforcement apparatus of the
nation's new civil rights laws.247  Courts thereafter upheld the practice
without characterizing it as a racial classification subject to the pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality - an understanding that has once
again been destabilized by social movement advocacy in our own
day.248 Today, after protest aimed at racial profiling in the criminal
246 For a general argument to this effect, see Balkin & Siegel, supra note io. See also Reva B.
Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
i, ii-i6 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (making this argument with ref-
erence to sex discrimination case law). Richard Primus illustrates in some detail how characteriz-
ing a practice as a racial classification can involve normative judgments, as well as positive ones.
See Primus, supra note 157, at 509-I5.
247 See supra note 158.
248 In the 1970s, federal courts twice rejected challenges to government collection of racial data
pursuant to civil rights legislation. In United States v. New Hampshire, the First Circuit upheld
the racial data collection requirements of section 709(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-8(c) (2000), as a reasonable exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers, without ever discussing whether the data collection requirement was a racial
classification. See United States v. New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277 (ist Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1023 (976). Two years later, when plaintiffs raised equal protection challenges to racial data
collection required as part of an Office of Civil Rights investigation of teacher placement in New
York schools, the Second Circuit merely cited the First Circuit to support its statement that "the
Constitution itself does not condemn the collection of this data." Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ., 583
F.2d 6o5, 6ii (2d Cir. 1978).
In 2ooo, a federal district court denied plaintiffs' claims that the racial identification ques-
tions on the U.S. Census form violated the Fifth Amendment. Rejecting the argument that the
census requirements had to be reviewed as racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny, the court
cited United States v. New Hampshire and explained simply: "Plaintiffs' position is based upon a
misunderstanding of the distinction between collecting demographic data so that the government
may have the information it believes at a given time it needs in order to govern, and governmen-
tal use of suspect classifications without a compelling interest." Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d
801, 814 (S.D. Tex. 2ooo). The court characterized the census questions as "requiring a person to
self-classify racially or ethnically," and on this ground exempted the practice from heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny, so long as the information gathered was not put to secondary discriminatory pur-
poses. Id. at 814; see also id. at 815 ("The issue raised by the plaintiffs is one properly addressed
by Congress, not by the courts."). In other words, racial data collection understood to serve ra-
cially egalitarian aims still is not deemed a racial classification subject to the presumption of un-
constitutionality. Cf Angela P. Harris, Cluster III: Introduction, 55 FLA. L. REV. 319, 326 (2003)
(observing that equal protection doctrine "prohibit[s] malignant race-conscious 'state action' in an
ever-widening number of arenas, while at the same time [allowing the state to] keep[] track of
people by racial classification for the purpose of administering antidiscrimination law").
Today, there is a social movement dedicated to recharacterizing racial data collection for
civil rights enforcement as a practice of racial classification subject to the presumption of uncon-
stitutionality. For discussion of the Racial Privacy Initiative, see supra p. 147 i. For an analysis of
data collection as a practice of racial construction, and an account of political mobilization ad-
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justice system, the judiciary is uneasily beginning to consider whether
law enforcement practices commonly used to describe and apprehend
suspects amount to racial classifications within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause. 24 9 Normative debate about the ways we rec-
oncile values of security and equality, and the role that judges should
play in this process, will in the end determine whether the legal system
characterizes such practices as racial classifications. 250  Informed by
social mobilization, courts will draw on anticlassification discourse to
express or limit concerns about status harm that the practices pose.
B. Legitimacy Concerns Haunting Constitutional Equality Discourse
Why does equal protection law rely so heavily on the presumption
that racial classification is unconstitutional to vindicate shifting and
often contradictory values?
As Part I of this Article demonstrates, an initial, important purpose
of the presumption was to relieve those adjudicating segregation of the
burden of explaining why the practice violated the Constitution.
Brown declared racial segregation of public schools unconstitutional
because of the harm that segregation inflicted on black children - and
met with unrelenting criticism. Over time, the Court abandoned the
effort to explain why segregation was unconstitutional in favor of ad-
judicating by means of the presumption that racial classifications are
unconstitutional. It seems to have embraced adjudication by presump-
tion at least in part to build its authority to challenge the racial status
quo.
In deciding Brown, the Court had adopted an interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause that would alienate groups with the social
standing and skills to challenge the authority of the Court itself. As
the Court read the Constitution to draw into question the position and
values of whites who sought to maintain segregation, they in turn
charged the Court with illegitimacy and group partiality. Under as-
sault, the Court needed more than a principled justification for its in-
terpretive practice. It needed an account of the Constitution that
could command the allegiance - if not the assent, then the engaged
dissent - of those the Court's decisions had estranged.
When the problem is stated in these terms, it is evident why the
Court and many of those defending its work began to shy from openly
dressing the 2000 Census, see Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and the
National Imagination, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1701 (2003).
249 For an overview of the complex arguments in this debate, see Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235
F.3 d 769, 771-77 (2d Cir. 2000) (Walker, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); id. at
779-89 (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 789-92 (Straub, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc); and Banks, supra note 16o.
250 See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note so.
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justifying equal protection decisions in language concerned with group
inequality or associated concepts of subordination and status. Reason-
ing about practices that unjustly disadvantage groups, or enforce their
inferior or second-class status, involves positive and normative claims
of a politically provocative sort. As a descriptive matter, concepts of
subordination focus attention on agonistic group relations that struc-
ture the polity. As a normative matter, concepts of subordination draw
into question the legitimacy of customary practices and understandings
that regulate, and rationalize, the social position of groups.
More deeply, interpreting the Constitution to prohibit practices that
enforce group inequality raises questions about the privileges of the
most powerful in society. And it seems to display differential solicitude
for groups, defying longstanding conventions of deference to privilege
the well-being of the less powerful over that of the more powerful.
Finally, open efforts to remedy group inequalities may have the para-
doxical effect of entrenching them, precisely as the intervention height-
ens political consciousness and conflict.25 1 For these reasons, a court
that openly advocates redress of group subordination may excite the
resistance of those who have long assumed the legitimacy of their own
authority, and may inhibit compromise or coalition with those who
stand to benefit from the judicial decree.
Of course, these liabilities may not outweigh the benefits and vir-
tues of normative clarity. Judges may exercise their authority forth-
rightly or sacrifice normative clarity in the interests of securing
change, as their understanding of circumstances and role requires. But
a court seeking to intervene in a status order must make judgments
about when and how to proceed, knowing that, in the end, it cannot
secure systemic change through brute force; efforts to transform a soci-
251 For Justice O'Connor's expression of these concerns, see supra note 241. Many have urged
that the use of race-conscious tools to redress racial inequality may exact high social costs. These
concerns were first most energetically expressed by conservatives, but they have now been taken
up by advocates across the political spectrum. Of course, those of different political commitments
differently assess the costs; they may be concerned about balkanization or coalition-building, or
about racial essentialism, domination, or victimization. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Equality Trou-
ble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 2001 (2000)
("On the left, social critics have argued that political organizing based on race has prevented the
development of broader and potentially more effective alliances based on class. On the right, crit-
ics argue that identity politics have fragmented America, that the professional race agitators who
work in identity politics have failed to truly serve their communities, and that identity politics
create a culture of victimhood which rewards passivity and blaming others for one's problems."
(footnote omitted)); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity,
Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2002) ("Despite the general opposition
to colorblindness among liberal scholars and Critical Race Theorists, several left-identified com-
mentators have recently begun to challenge this conventional thinking concerning race .... [They]
maintain that by clinging to race as an aspect of individual and group identity, people of color
allow a construct rooted in domination to define their existence and fail to reconstruct their lives
in a way that transcends the language of the dominant culture." (footnote omitted)).
20041 1545
HeinOnline -- 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1545 2003-2004
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ety through constitutional adjudication require the political confidence
and consent of the very groups a court would subject to the force of
law. The groups whose social privilege law circumscribes may object,
vociferously; but they must, in the end, recognize the Constitution to
which they are subject as their law, or it will lack authority as law.
This, at a higher level of abstraction, is the history of anticlassifica-
tion discourse as it developed in the decades after Brown. In Cooper v.
Aaron,2 5 2 the Court asserted that it had the ultimate authority to
enunciate constitutional meaning, but it only secured Brown's author-
ity over time, with the ongoing involvement of the representative
branches of the federal government and a multifaceted movement for
race emancipation 5 3 The Court led, followed, retreated, and com-
promised in interpreting the Constitution, as communities across the
nation made claims on its meaning. The indirection and the internal
contradictions of anticlassification discourse are artifacts of this strug-
gle. To this day, equal protection law remains unclear about the na-
ture of the harm it is rectifying and the values it is vindicating. These
matters remain subject to continual negotiation, with answers evolving
as the federal judiciary struggles to define equal protection doctrine in
terms that can sustain the conflicted assent of the nation. In the
shadow of these negotiations, legal and political developments in the
half-century since Brown have alleviated, but by no means eliminated,
the racial stratification of American society - a history in which, for
some, Brown's promise is realized, and for others, it is betrayed.
Today, most Americans believe that state action classifying on the
basis of race is unconstitutional - yet there remains wide-ranging dis-
agreement about the understandings and practices this presumption
implicates, and why. The presumption's capacity to sustain this form
of conflicted assent would seem to be the ground of its constitutional
authority. For a norm that can elicit the fealty of a divided nation
forges community in dissensus, enabling the debates through which the
meaning of a nation's constitutional commitments evolves in history.
CONCLUSION
It is commonly assumed that the modern equal protection tradition
is founded on the principle that the state may not classify on the basis
of race - an understanding that, in legal and popular citation, the
252 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
253 See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 282-310 (1992) (considering
Brown's enforcement from the standpoint of Justice Jackson's observation that "our decision does
not end but begins the struggle over segregation" (quoting Justice Jackson's draft concurrence in
Brown) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by
Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, I Io YALE L.J. 441, 5 16-
17 (2ooo); see also supra pp. I5o-O2.
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Court first announced in Brown. This Article has shown that the anti-
classification principle was not the ground of the Brown decision, but
instead emerged from struggles over the decision's enforcement.
What difference does it make to understand the anticlassification
principle as the residuum of struggles over enforcing Brown? By re-
constructing the history of the presumption that racial classification is
unconstitutional, we can better appreciate how, over the decades, an
apparently simple precept has been deployed in the service of a shift-
ing and conflicted array of social values. The modern equal protection
tradition is commonly understood to be founded on an embrace of in-
dividualism associated with an anticlassification principle and a repu-
diation of concerns about group inequality associated with an
antisubordination principle. History richly complicates this picture, as
it shows that courts have deployed the presumption against racial
classification to express, to disguise, and to limit constitutional
concerns about practices that enforce group inequality. The record
also identifies some of the legitimacy concerns that led courts to
practice indirection and contradiction in constitutional interpretation,
as judges endeavored to mask and to limit a constitutional regime that
would intervene in the affairs of groups with social authority, on
behalf of those with less.
This more complex positive account of the past and the principles
that define our constitutional tradition has normative implications for
the claims we can make upon one another in the present. It teaches
that concerns about group subordination are at the heart of the mod-
ern equal protection tradition - and, at the same time, suggests im-
portant reasons why such concerns have been persistently disguised,
qualified, and bounded. For this reason, it is a history of debates over
Brown with disquieting import for proponents and critics of antisub-
ordination jurisprudence alike. More deeply, it is a history of debates
over Brown that shows how racial conflict haunts the silences, ambi-
guities, and conflicts of modern equal protection doctrine. Finally, it is
a history of debates over Brown that suggests how the contours of con-
stitutional principle emerge from the crucible of constitutional politics.
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